State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases by Weisburd, A.M.
State Courts, Federal Courts, and
International Cases
A.M. Weisburd t
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................... 1
II. BASES OF THE FEDERALIZING APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL CASES ............ 3
11. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AS FEDERAL COMMON LAW: THE DOCTRINE'S
CONSEQUENCES AND THE STATES' REACTIONS ....................... 8
A. The Impact of Federalizing Customary International Law ............ 8
B. Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: Contrary
Arguments, Inconsistent Cases ............................. 11
C. State Court Failures to Follow the Filartiga Line ................. 12
IV. CASES INVOLVING FOREIGN RELATIONS AS FEDERAL COMMON LAW: CASES AND
ARGUMENTS PRO AND CON ................................... 15
A. "Foreign Relations Cases" as Federal Coimnon Law ............... 15
B. Arguments and Authority Inconsistent with a Broad Federal Common Law
of Foreign Relations ................................... 19
V. JURISDICTIONAL AND RELATED PROBLEMS OF THE FEDERALIZING APPROACH TO
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ............................... 28
A. Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: Analysis of
Supporting Authority ................................... 28
1. Filartiga: Problems with Its Reading of the Case Law .......... 28
2. Filartiga and the Views of the Framers ................... 35
B. Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: Contrary
Authority .......................................... 38
1. Pre-Erie Cases .................................. 38
2. The Effect of Erie and Subsequent Cases .................. 41
C. Customary International Law as Federal Comnmon Law and the Separation
of Powers ......................................... 44
VI. RESOLVING JUDGE JESSUP'S DILEMMA ............................ 48
VII. THE LIMITS OF THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS ........ 56
VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................ 63
I. INTRODUCTION
The world is growing more interdependent, with individual nations
unable and indeed generally unwilling to avoid extensive contact with
one another. America's expanding international contacts necessarily
affect many social institutions, including the law. To meet the demands
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of this increased globalization, the American legal system requires a
coherent analytical system for addressing cases with international
elements. The current system, however, meets this demand only in part.
While cases involving international treaties are not especially
troublesome, American courts encounter analytical problems in cases
involving customary international law. American courts have also
experienced some confusion in addressing cases that, while they involve
neither treaties nor customary international law, have significant
international elements.
To be sure, an analytical framework has been suggested for cases
having some international element but not involving treaties, i.e. cases
based on customary international law or simply having an international
aspect.' The approach adopted by some federal courts is to assert that
customary international law is federal common law2 - a claim echoed
by the American Law Institute3 - and also that "there is federal
question jurisdiction over actions having important foreign policy
implications," 4 even in cases in which questions of international law are
not at issue.5
This "federalizing approach" to international cases poses a number
of problems. First, extended to their logical limits, these broad federal
claims infringe upon state authority over subjects long understood to be
matters for state law determination. Second, taken literally, these claims
conflict with decisions of state courts- and some federal holdings.
Finally, federal jurisdiction over many of these claims depends on
extremely weak arguments that raise separation of powers concerns.
Thus, serious difficulties inhere in the only analytical framework
put forward to deal with nontreaty international cases. This Article
proposes a new framework. Part II explains the basis for the federalizing
approach to nontreaty international cases. Part III illustrates how
equating customary international law with federal common law leads to
federal - or international - supersession of state law to a surprising
extent, and demonstrates that state courts have in fact rejected that
doctrine. Similarly, Part IV illustrates the broad reach of some federal
courts' assertions that domestic law cases with international elements
must involve federal common law. This Part also demonstrates the
1. These two groups of cases will hereinafter be collectively labelled "nontreaty international
cases."
2. See, e.g., In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied sub nom. Marcos-Manotoc v. Trajano, 113 S.Ct. 2960 (1993).
3. RESTATEMENT (THIM) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111
(1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS].
4. Republic of the Phil. v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 353 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed sub
nor. Ancor Holdings, N.V. v. Republic of the Phil., 480 U.S. 942 (1987), and cert. denied sub
nom. New York Land Co. v. Republic of Phil., 481 U.S. 1048 (1987).
5. See, e.g., Republic of the Phil., 806 F.2d at 344; Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp.
61 (S.D. Tex. 1994); Grynberg Prod. Corp. v. British Gas. P.L.C., 817 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D.
Tex. 1993).
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extent to which state courts and some federal courts have refused to
accept broad federalization of cases that happen to contain international
elements. Part V examines in detail the jurisdictional weaknesses of the
argument that customary international law is federal common law. Part
VI offers a new analysis of the place of customary international law in
the American judicial system that analogizes customary international law
to the law of a foreign sovereign and applies it accordingly. Finally, Part
VII develops standards for determining when federal common law
should displace state law in nontreaty international cases.
II. BASES OF THE FEDERALIZING APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL
CASES
Two related but distinct assertions underlie the federalizing
approach to international cases. First, some federal decisions hold that
customary international law is federal common law. Second, others in
effect hold that cases touching on international relations to any extent
must also involve federal law. These two positions are based on three
lines of cases.
Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala6 is the leading opinion in the first line of
decisions.' In this damage suit, two Paraguayan citizens alleged that one
of their Paraguayan family members was tortured to death in Paraguay
by the Inspector General of Police in Asunci6n, who was also a citizen
of Paraguay.8 The plaintiffs brought suit against the Inspector General
in a federal court in New York after learning that he was in the United
States.9 They asserted that 28 U.S.C. § 1350, the Alien Tort Claims
Act ("ATCA"), granted jurisdiction in the federal district court.10 The
ATCA grants jurisdiction to the federal district courts over "any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States."" The plaintiffs argued that
because torture was a violation of customary international law, their
claim alleged a "tort. .. in violation of the law of nations" 2 within
the meaning of § 1350.'3
6. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
7. Cases relying on Filartiga for the proposition that customary international law is federal
common law include United States v. Schiffer, 836 F. Supp. 1164, 1170 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd,
31 F.3d 1175 (3d Cir. i994); United States v. Buck, 690 F. Supp. 1291, 1297 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
rev'd on other grounds, 813 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 857 (1987); Ishtyaq
v. Nelson, 627 F. Supp. 13, 27 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1426
(C.D. Cal. 1985); Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 798 (D. Kan. 1980),
aff'd on other grounds, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). Cf Estate of Marcos, 978 F.2d at 502
(reaching result on this issue identical to that in Filartiga but not citing that case in support).
8. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
9. Id. at 878-79.
10. Id. at 880.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993).
12. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993)).
13. Id. at 880-85.
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The defendant responded that federal courts had no jurisdiction
over the plaintiffs' claim under Article IIl of the Constitution. 4 He
noted that jurisdiction depended on establishing that cases involving
customary international law were "cases . . . arising under the laws of
the United States"t 5 and argued that they were not. The jurisdictional
question thus turned on the status of customary international law as part
of U.S. law. 6
The court held that application of the statute did not offend Article
M. It cited scholarship on eighteenth-century legal history to show that
the law of nations was considered an element of the common law at that
time, and demonstrated that a primary motive for framing the
Constitution was to unify the United States' approach to the law of
nations. 7 The court also relied on certain diversity and admiralty cases
in which the Supreme Court had applied the law of nations, quoting The
Nereide18 to the effect that international law is "'part of the law of the
land'"" and The Paquete Habana" that "'[i]nternational law is part
of our law.'"2 It concluded that customary international law is federal
common law, and that a suit based on customary international law thus
arises under the "laws of the United States. "'
Part V will analyze Filartiga thoroughly. At this point, it is enough
to note that its reasoning is questionable. The decision fails to address,
let alone distinguish, several Supreme Court decisions that appear
contrary to its holding. Nor does it consider the potentially sweeping
effect of the rule it applies. First, if customary international law is
federal law, it must displace state law in the event of a conflict. Given
the broad claims made in some quarters for the reach of customary
international law, the likelihood of federal/state conflict is great.
Furthermore, the Filartiga rule could alter the formulation of foreign
policy because it implies that officials of the federal government would
be bound, as a matter of domestic law, to adhere to customary
international law.
14. Id. at 885.
15. U.S. CONST., art. 1II, §2, cl. 1. None of the other headings of Article III were relevant.
It was not suggested that the suit arose under the Constitution or a treaty of the United States, or
that it involved foreign diplomats or admiralty jurisdiction. Furthermore, because all parties were
aliens, the case fell outside Article lit's grant of diversity jurisdiction. See Hodgson v. Bowerbank,
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 303 (1809) (holding Court lacks jurisdiction where both parties are aliens).
16. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 886.
17. Id.
18. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815).
19. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887 (quoting The Nereide, 13 U.S. at 422).
20. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
21. Filartilga, 630 F.2d at 887 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700). In addition,
the court supported its claim to jurisdiction with a quote from The Federalist No. 3.
"[T]reaties. . .will always be expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner, whereas
adjudications on the same points and questions in the thirteen states will not always accord or be
consistent." Id. at 886-87.
22. Id.
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The second line of cases relevant to this article begins with Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,2  which arose from the Cuban
government's confiscation of sugar from an American-owned Cuban
corporation. When the sugar was subsequently exported to New York
and sold, the proceeds were transmitted to Sabbatino, the New York
receiver of the corporation's assets, rather than to Banco Nacional, the
Cuban government's representative. Banco Nacional then sued Sabbatino
for conversion in federal district court in New York.24 The case in the
Supreme Court turned on the application of the act of state doctrine, the
principle that "courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts
of the government of another done within its own territory."' The
lower courts had ruled the doctrine inapplicable because Cuba allegedly
violated customary international law by seizing the sugar.26
In deciding the effect of the act of state doctrine, the Supreme
Court held that federal rather than state law governed the matter, even
though jurisdiction rested on diversity of citizenship and despite the
acknowledged similarity between the federal and New York approaches
to act of state questions. The Court held that "a basic choice regarding
the competence and function of the Judiciary and the National Executive
in ordering our relationships with other members of the international
community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law."27
It referred approvingly to Judge Jessup's argument against leaving
questions of international law to "divergent and perhaps parochial state
interpretations," 2' and discussed other circumstances in which the
courts had developed federal common law. 9 It also supported its
decision by citing in a footnote "[v]arious constitutional and statutory
provisions" that "reflect[ed] a concern for uniformity in this country's
dealings with foreign nations and indicated a desire to give matters of
international significance to the jurisdiction of federal institutions."3"
The Court went on to hold that the act of state doctrine applied in this
case even though Cuba's taking of the sugar allegedly violated
international law. In explaining its position, the Court stressed the high
degree of disagreement among governments regarding the legality of the
type of action Cuba had taken and emphasized the need for the judiciary
to avoid activity that might interfere with Executive Branch conduct of
23. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). Cases relying on Sabbatino will be mentioned throughout.
24. Id. at 400-06.
25. Id. at 416 (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)).
26. 376 U.S. at 406-07.
27. Id. at 425 (footnote omitted).
28. Id. The article to which the Court was referring, Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 740 (1939), is discussed
in detail below. See infra Part VI. Philip Jessup was an Anericanjudge on the International Court
of Justice.
29. 376 U.S. at 426-27.
30. Id. at 427 n.25.
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foreign policy.31
Sabbatino is central to an understanding of the federalizing
approach for three reasons. First, it is the only Supreme Court authority
for the proposition that federal common law encompasses foreign
relations questions. It provides little guidance, however, as to the reach
of this body of federal law. Second, the approving reference in dictum
to Judge Jessup's article is the only support the Supreme Court has
provided for the proposition that customary international law should be
seen as federal common law. Sabbatino is ambiguous on this point,
however, because it expressly refuses to apply international law to the
facts before it. Finally, Sabbatino has lent itself to inaccurate
characterization by courts employing the federalizing approach. For
example, Filartiga cites Sabbatino - incorrectly - as a case "applying
rules of international law uncodified in any act of Congress." 2
The last line of cases relevant to this discussion derives from
Zschernig v. Miller,"3 with additional influence from the earlier case of
Clark v. Allen. 4 At issue in Clark was the application of a California
statute that conditioned the rights of nonresident aliens to inherit
property in California upon the reciprocal rights of American citizens to
take property in the country of which the nonresident aliens were
nationals and inhabitants.35 Absent such reciprocity, alien heirs/legatees
could not inherit under the statute; the property in question would pass
to heirs other than the aliens in question or would escheat.35
The Attorney General of the United States argued that the Court
should permit four German nationals to inherit real and personal
property that had been left to them by a California resident of
undetermined nationality.37 He noted that the United States and
Germany had entered into a treaty guaranteeing the rights of German
beneficiaries of American wills to receive property. The Court agreed
as to realty but rejected this argument as to personal property. In doing
so, it read the treaty as applying only to personal property bequeathed
to Germans by testators who were themselves German nationals, not to
bequests to Germans from American citizens .3 Because the nationality
of the decedent had not been established, the Court remanded for a
31. Id. at 427-37.
32. 630 F.2d at 886-87.
33. 389 U.S. 429 (1968). This Article will describe cases relying on Zvchernig throughout.
34. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
35. Id. at 505-07.
36. Id. at 506 n.l (describing California Probate Code § 259).
37. The case had originally been brought by the Alien Property Custodian, who had vested
himself with the rights of the four Germans under the will and sought a declaration that the
California statute would not affect the Germans' rights. At the time of argument before the U.S.
Supreme Court, the U.S. Attorney General had succeeded to the functions of the Alien Property
Custodian. Id. at 505-16.
38. Id. at 507-16.
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determination of this question.39
As an alternative, the Attorney General argued that the statute was
an unconstitutional extension of state power into the field of foreign
affairs exclusively reserved to the federal government.' The Court
rejected this argument as "farfetched."" It observed that local law
governed rights of succession and held that, absent a treaty requiring a
contrary result, negotiations between California and a foreign state, or
California's entry into a compact with a foreign state, there was no basis
for disregarding state policy. While the Court acknowledged that the
statute would have "some incidental or indirect effect in foreign
countries," it held such effects to be irrelevant.42
The Court decided Zschernig against this background. The
decedent in Zschernig, an Oregon resident, had died intestate in 1962,
leaving realty and personalty; all of his heirs were citizens of the
German Democratic Republic.43 Like California, Oregon conditioned
the inheritance of property in Oregon by nonresident aliens on reciprocal
rights of inheritance in the countries of which the aliens were nationals.
The Oregon statute also required proof that such alien heirs would
receive the "benefit, use or control" of the property at issue without
confiscation." The Oregon courts had held that the treaty between the
United States and Germany construed in Clark protected the rights of the
East German heirs in Zschernig to the realty portion of the estate. They
also held, however, that the statute precluded their taking the personalty,
which would escheat under the terms of the statute.4 5
The Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional as applied,
thereby reversing the Oregon courts as to the personalty. It observed
that, in operation, the statute had led Oregon judges to inquire "into the
actual administration of foreign law" and "the credibility of foreign
diplomatic statements," and to speculate whether funds dispatched under
the statute would actually be received.46 The Court noted instances in
which Oregon courts criticized Communist governments, sometimes
dismissing the language of foreign statutes because the foreign
governments promulgating them were "untrustworthy."" The Court
strongly disapproved of state court criticism of foreign governments.4"
While it rejected state involvement in foreign relations, the Court was
also at pains to distinguish Clark by explaining that Clark involved
39. Id. at 518.
40. Id. at 516-17.
41. Id. at 517.
42. Id.
43. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430.
44. Id. at430&n.1.
45. Id. at 431-32.
46. Id. at 434.
47. ld. at 437-40.
48. Id. at 441.
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nothing more than "the routine reading of foreign laws. " " The
decision made clear that state courts were not precluded from reading,
construing and applying the laws of foreign countries, but held that their
role could not extend to passing judgment on foreign regimes."
What then can be said of these three lines of cases? First, Filartiga
clearly holds that customary international law is federal common law.
Second, Sabbatino holds as clearly that the application of the act of state
doctrine is a matter of federal common law because it regulates relations
between the federal executive branch and the judiciary. Finally,
Zschernig holds that too-minute inquiries by state court judges into the
internal workings of foreign governments, as well as their expressions
of opinions critical of such governments, amount to an unconstitutional
intrusion by state officials into an exclusively federal domain. These
rulings nevertheless raise a number of questions.
Later Sections in this Article address some of these questions. To
understand why they are significant, however, one must first explore the
potentially broad effects of federalizing customary international law and
international cases generally.
III. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AS FEDERAL COMMON LAW:
THE DOCTRINE'S CONSEQUENCES AND THE STATES' REACTIONS
Filartiga's holding that customary international law is an element
of federal common law, taken literally, would federalize a number of
areas of law that have traditionally been under state control. This Section
clarifies the scope of this potential change, advances reasons of principle
against such a development, and demonstrates that state courts have been
unwilling to subordinate themselves to international legal standards to the
degree that Filartiga's holding would require.
A. The Impact of Federalizing Customary International Law
The proposition that customary international law is federal common
law would profoundly affect the law of the states. It is hornbook law
that "[i]f an issue is controlled by federal common law, this [body of
law] is binding on both state and federal courts,""1 and that "federal
common law displaces state statutory as well as state decisional law.""2
Any rule of state jurisprudence must yield in the face of federal common
law. Thus, if customary international law is federal common law, any
rule of state law that conflicts with a rule of customary international law
will be displaced.
49. Id. at 432-34.
50. Id.
51. CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 415 (5th ed. 1994).
52. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 224 (2d ed. 1993).
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Given these propositions, it is important to identify what rights
customary international law guarantees and what duties it imposes.
Rights and duties under customary law are difficult to specify, however,
because little agreement exists as to the proper method of demonstrating
that a putative rule is one of customary international law. For example,
the Filartiga court, in holding that the "law of nations" forbade states
to torture their own citizens, relied on declarations by the U.N. General
Assembly, the language of two regional human rights treaties, the
provisions of one general multilateral human rights covenant, the
constitutions of fifty-five countries forbidding torture, and the absence
of any government's affirmative assertion of the right to torture its
citizens. Though the court noted that customary international law derives
from the behavior of nations, it rejected the suggestion that the regular
use of torture by a number of states was legally significant and asserted
that violations of a legal norm do not destroy the norm. 3 Employing
a similar approach, Professor D'Amato has argued that the generalizable
provisions of a multilateral treaty attain customary international law
status upon the treaty's conclusion absent language to the contrary in
other treaties.' Although respectable authorities have seriously
questioned the legal basis for using such methods to determine the
content of customary international law,5' whether Filartiga's or
Professor D'Amato's analyses are ultimately correct as a matter of
international law is not the only consideration: litigants may invoke
support from such authorities to argue that a given legal rule has
customary international law status and thus insulate themselves from
accusations of proceeding frivolously.
The differing methods of determining the content of customary
international law produce different lists of rights protected by that body
of law. The Restatement of Foreign Relations asserts that a government
violates customary international law if as a matter of policy it practices,
encourages, or condones genocide, slavery, "disappearances," torture,
or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. In
addition, the Restatement asserts that international law forbids prolonged
arbitrary detention, systematic racial discrimination, and patterns of
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.56
Professor Sohn has gone further by arguing that both the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights 7 and the International Covenant on Civil
53. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880-84, 884 n.15.
54. ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 123-45 (1987).
55. See Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus
Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 82, 84-98 (1992).
56. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 3, § 702.
57. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
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and Political Rights5" have passed into customary international law. 59
These instruments set out a longer list of rights than does the
Restatement of Foreign Relations and address several additional subjects.
For example, Article 24 of the Universal Declaration provides that
"[e]veryone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable
limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay."60
Article 25(l) adds:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical
care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control."'
The International Covenant deals with fewer subjects than does the
Universal Declaration and, in most of its articles, imposes requirements
similar to those of the U.S. Constitution. Its Article 6(5), however,
forbids imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by persons
under eighteen years of age.62
Finally, the methodologies of the Filartiga court and Professor
D'Amato may generate still longer lists of rights protected by customary
international law. For example, if one accepts Professor D'Amato's
argument that generalizable provisions of multilateral treaties are ipso
facto rules of customary international law, then the substantive
provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women63 are rules of customary international
law. That convention requires "appropriate measures" to root out
"prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the
idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women."' As customary international
law, the convention (and, according to Professor D'Amato's argument,
all other human rights conventions) would by extension apply to the
states as federal common law. Needless to say, the collective application
of such treaties would force fundamental changes in state law.
The obligations imposed on the states through the application of
customary international law as federal common law could thus be
extremely far reaching. To be sure, even a court equating customary
international law with federal common law would not necessarily label
58. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, openedforsignature Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter International Covenant].
59. Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather
Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 17, 32 (1982).
60. Universal Declaration, supra note 57, art. 24.
61. Id. art. 25(1).
62. International Covenant, supra note 58, art. 6(5), 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
63. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18,
1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
64. Id. at 17, art. 5.
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all of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or all treaty provisions
as customary international law. However, while such a result would not
necessarily follow from the belief that customary international law is
federal common law, a court inclined to reach that result could easily
find authority to support it.
In sum, depending on the method it employs to determine the
content of customary international law and, therefore, federal common
law, the federalizing approach could lead to the displacement of rules of
state law encompassing'a broad iange of subjects.
B. Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: Contrary
Arguments, Inconsistent Cases
The potentially widespread effect of treating customary
international law as federal common law would lead to great changes in
the existing legal system. While change is not necessarily bad, at least
two grounds for questioning the desirability of treating customary
international law as federal common law appear significant in this case.
The first reason for concern is that such a step could displace the
law of an American state without action by that state's government or
by any branch of the federal government, including the judiciary. This
automatic displacement is possible because customary international law
can develop without the participation of all countries; it requires only a
general practice of states and can thus bind governments that have
simply failed to object while a practice was becoming a legal rule.6
Such legal rules would be binding on citizens and U.S. courts even if
the U.S. government had not contributed to their evolution. Rules of
customary international law that developed without American
participation would thus supersede both state common and statutory law.
This result is troubling. Displacement of state law that conflicts
with the federal Constitution or a federal statute fits comfortably into
Americans' understanding of the limits federalism imposes on state
autonomy. However, displacing state law with a rule that may have
come into existence without the participation of any U.S. official does
not square with American majoritarian assumptions about the sources of
law, as Professor Trimble has noted.66
While Professor Trimble considered the negative impact that
domestic integration of customary international law would have at the
federal level, his concerns are equally applicable to the displacement of
state law.67 Indeed, his arguments apply with more force in the state
context. After all, the federal government has the ability to influence the
65. Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 665, 679-80 (1986).
66. See id. at 718-21.
67. See id.
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formation of customary international law through its participation in the
law-making process. Individual American states have no such
opportunity. Thus, issues overlooked by the federal executive but of
great importance to a small number of states may be controlled by a
federalized rule of customary international law that the inhabitants of
those states could in no way affect.
While Professor Brilmayer disagreed with this position,6 8 her
objections do not address the problems that arise when customary
international law displaces state law in a purely domestic case.
Brilmayer's contention that the use of international law by courts often
raises no countermajoritarian difficulties 69 cannot apply to cases in
which a customary law rule displaces a statute. Her observation that
international law defines certain powers of the elected branches7" is
most applicable to organs of the federal government, not to state
governments. She also argues that because customary law depends on
the consent of the countries comprising the international system, it raises
no more of a countermajoritarian problem than do treaties.7" Treaties,
however, become binding only after some affirmative action by the
President and the Senate. In contrast, a rule of customary law could
apply to the United States even where American officials remained silent
during its formation.
This countermajoritarian concern is exacerbated by the second
difficulty that treating customary international law as federal common
law presents for the states: some methods for determining the content of
customary international law yield a long list of subjects governed by that
law. Treating customary international law as federal common law could
thus affect a surprising number of state cases. If one accepts the
proposition - advanced by a number of respectable authorities - that
customary international law imposes duties on individuals and protects
them from certain actions by their own governments, then a case need
present no obvious international element to raise a question of
international law.' Not only would state law be subordinate to norms
developed in the face of U.S. reticence, but these norms could also
govern a tremendously wide range of substantive issues.
C. State Court Failures to Follow the Filartiga Line
68. Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE
L.J. 2277, 2309-11 (1991).
69. Id. at 2310.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Numerous authorities take this position. Regarding international protection of human
rights generally, see Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881-84 (prohibition of torture); RESTATEMENT OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 3, §§ 701-02; Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of International
Human Rights Law, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIHTs PRACTICE 3 (Hurst Hannum
ed., 2d ed. 1992). Regarding duties imposed on individuals, see IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 561-64 (4th ed. 1990).
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Aside from the arguments counseling against treating customary
international law as federal common law, case law clearly illustrates the
impracticality of this proposition. State courts do not, in fact, treat
customary international law as federal law.
If customary international law were federal common law, state
courts would be compelled to apply the international legal rules
whenever litigants made claims grounded in customary international law,
regardless of whether the rules were contrary to state law. Of course,
the state court might determine that the international legal rule did not
apply on the facts, but it could not reject the relevance of customary
international law out of hand and act consistently with the proposition
that federal common law includes customary international law.
In practice, state courts faced with arguments that customary
international law displaces provisions of state law have generally adhered
to state law. They have been especially hostile to customary international
law defenses in criminal trespass actions against antiwar protestors. For
example, in Yoos v. State73 the court rejected the defendants' argument
that their protest against Trident missiles at the Kennedy Space Center
was necessary to prevent the commission of a war crime or a crime
against humanity.74 In doing so, the court held: "International law is
not paramount to, and does not in any way supersede, Florida criminal
law. Accordingly, international law does not provide a valid legal
defense to a violation of the criminal laws of this state. "' Similarly,
State v. Marley upheld trespass convictions of Vietnam war protestors
who refused to leave a weapons plant even though the defendants argued
that the weapons manufactured at the plant were illegal under various
international theories.76 The Supreme Court of Hawaii held that
customary international law did not take precedence over state criminal
statutes. It quoted Skiriotes v. United States77 for the proposition that:
International law is a part of our law and as such is the law of all States of the
Union . . . but it is a part of our law for the application of its own principles, and
these are concerned with international rights and duties and not with domestic
rights and duties.78
Yoos and Marley stand for the proposition that international law does not
displace state law and thus imply that international law is not federal
73. 522 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (per curiam).
74. Id. at 899.
75. Id.
76. State v. Marley, 509 P.2d 1095, 1099 (Haw. 1971).
77. 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
78. 509 P.2d at 1107 (quoting Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 72-73). The Hawaii court reasoned that
because, under Skiriotes, a state may regulate the conduct of citizens outside its territory, afortiori,
a state can regulate its citizens' behavior within its territory regardless of international law. Id. at
1107. The Marley court seems to have misread Skiriotes, which appears to hold that the state action
questioned was permitted by international law, not that international law was irrelevant in purely
domestic matters. See 313 U.S. at 73-74, 77-79.
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common law. 79
The California court gave more credence to customary international
law arguments by antinuclear weapons protestors in In re Weller.8"
These defendants argued that their trespassing was necessary because
international law obliged them to prevent the development of the Trident
missile.8 ' Unlike the Yoos and Marley courts, the California court
analyzed the defendants' arguments on the express assumption that
customary international law imposed on them an affirmative duty to
interfere with the development of the Trident.82 Weller nonetheless held
that, even if international law requires affirmative action to prevent some
activity, it does not justify affirmative illegal action.83 The court noted
that a democratic country need not "excuse violations of its laws by
those seeking to conform their country's policies to international law";
defendants were therefore consigned to seeking their objectives through
the ballot box or through court action.84
This conclusion follows only if international law does not displace
the law of an American state. Otherwise, the court would have had to
determine the precise contours of the defendants' international duty and
satisfy itself that they could fulfill that duty by activity consistent with
state law. Surely, if international law is paramount, the illegality of an
act under state law is irrelevant if international law requires it. The
court's conclusion in Weller necessarily assumes that international law
is not paramount - that it is not federal common law.
Clearly, state courts, at least in the criminal law context, are
unwilling to subordinate state law to customary international law. While
Yoos, Marley, and Weller differ in their reasoning and understanding of
customary international law, each implicitly rejects the proposition that
a rule of customary international law displaces a contrary law of an
American state.85
79. Other state courts have relied on Marley. See, e.g., State v. Champa, 494 A.2d 102 (R.I.
1985). In Champa, the Rhode Island Supreme Court cited Marley for the proposition that a claim
that one's own government has violated its treaty obligations raises a political question the courts
should not decide. The court ignored the defendants' argument that customary international law
forbids any cooperation with an agency producing nuclear weapons. Id. at 104-05. By relying on
the portion of the Marley opinion dealing with treaties rather than on the part addressing customary
international law, id. at 104-06, the court seemed to reject the position that customary international
law, as federal common law, is binding on the courts of the states.
80. 210 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
81. Id. at 131.
82. Id. at 133.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Recent U.S. Supreme Court holdings also impugn the status of customary international
law as federal law. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machafn, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2196 n.15
(1992) ("[Tlhe practice of nations under customary international law [is] of little aid in construing
the terms of an extradition treaty, or the authority of a court to later try an individual who has been
so abducted."); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 396 n.1 (1989) (rejecting relevance of
foreign capital punishment practices and expressly considering only American conceptions of
propriety of executing persons for crimes committed as juveniles).
1995] State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases 15
IV. CASES INVOLVING FOREIGN RELATIONS AS FEDERAL COMMON
LAW: CASES AND ARGUMENTS PRO AND CON
As noted in the Introduction, the federalizing approach goes
beyond the proposition that customary international law is federal
common law. Some federal courts have also asserted that federal
common law must govern cases affecting the foreign relations of the
United States whether or not customary international law is involved.
Depending on how one defines the concept of "foreign relations," the
potential scope of this doctrine is vast. Federal courts relying on
Sabbatino or Zschernig as authority for displacing state law have held
that federal law governs in a wide variety of circumstances. These
opinions, however, do not represent a consensus among federal
judges.86 Some federal courts have reached results contradicting these
cases, while others have dealt with related cases in ways that are hard
to reconcile with the "foreign means federal" approach. This
unwillingness to see all international cases as federal is also supported
by state authority and by arguments of principle.
A. "Foreign Relations Cases" as Federal- Common Law
Several cases suggest that federal law applies in cases where a
"foreign relations" issue is present. These decisions are important, not
because federal courts always follow the reasoning employed here, but
rather because they show the extremes to which federal courts have gone
in foreign relations cases and the difficulty of limiting the idea that cases
with international elements are necessarily federal.
In the area of conflicts of law, some federal courts have called for
displacing state law rules with federal rules due to perceived federal
interests. In Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank, 7 the Second
Circuit held that the enforceability of a confiscatory decree issued by the
new Iraqi republican government against its late king's New York assets
was a matter of federal law. The act of state doctrine did not apply to
the decree, according to the court, because the assets were located
within the United States at the time of the confiscation. 8 Moreover, the
degree of respect to which the decree was entitled was necessarily a
matter of federal law, as the nation must "speak with a united voice"89
on foreign acts of state affecting property in the United States in order
to avoid "needlessly complicat[ing] the handling of.. . foreign
relations."90 Because confiscatory actions were contrary to the public
policy of the United States, the court refused to give effect to the Iraqi
86. For further discussion of this point, see infra part IV.B.
87. 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
88. Id. at 51.
89. Id. at 50.
90. Id.
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decree. 9'
The court's holding in Republic of Iraq could be seen as requiring
a federal conflicts of law rule regarding foreign actions purporting to
affect property within the United States. Other cases evince judicial
support for the related principle that federal conflicts law governs
whether American courts should enforce the judgments of foreign courts
even though state conflicts rules normally apply in this area. In both Her
Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of B. C. v. Gilbertson92 and
Tahan v. Hodgson,93 federal courts suggested that the enforceability of
a foreign court judgment is a question of federal rather than state law.94
The court in Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo95 likewise applied
federal policy in an area normally left to the states where the basis of
the claim - maritime law - gave the case a federal character. The alien
litigant in Chick Kam Choo had had her federal suit dismissed on the
basis of forum non conveniens.96 She refiled her case in state court in
reliance on a state statute prohibiting dismissal on forum non conveniens
grounds.97 In response, the state court defendant obtained an injunction
against the state court proceeding from the federal district court.9" The
court of appeals upheld the injunction. It cited Zschernig and Sabbatino
in explaining that "[f]ederal law controls the international role of all
courts in the United States" and stressed the importance of the forum
non conveniens concept in federal maritime law.9 9 In essence, the court
of appeals took a case out of state court to ensure that federal practice
regarding forum non conveniens in maritime actions would control
despite state policies.
The courts in these cases justified their conclusions that federal law
applied by characterizing the legal issues involved as federal. In
Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, in contrast, the court held that
federal law must govern because of the dispute's potential impact on
U.S. relations with the foreign government litigant."° The Philippine
government in Republic of the Philippines filed for an injunction in a
New York state court in order to prevent the transfer of property it
believed Marcos, the former dictator of the Philippines, had purchased
with money stolen from the Philippine government and its citizens. The
plaintiff sought to maintain the injunction until the question of ownership
91. Id. at 51-53.
92. 597 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1979).
93. 662 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
94. Id. at 868 (holding enforcement of all foreign court judgments matter of federal law);
Gilbertson, 597 F.2d at 1163 & n.2 (holding enforcement of foreign court tax judgments matter
of federal law).
95. 817 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 486 U.S. 140 (1988).
96. Id. at 309 & n.1.
97. Id. at 309-10.
98. Id. at 309.
99. Id. at 321-25.
100. 806 F.2d at 354.
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could be resolved, either by an American court or through appropriate
proceedings in the Philippines. 0 '
The defendants 02 removed the case from the New York courts
to the federal courts, and the Philippine government supported the claim
that federal jurisdiction existed because the case arose under federal
law.0 3 The court of appeals agreed. Citing Sabbatino, the court
observed that the "plaintiff's claims necessarily require determinations
that will directly and significantly affect American foreign
relations,"" 4 and asserted that "there is federal question jurisdiction
over actions having important foreign policy implications."105 The
court stressed that the Philippine government had requested that
governments of other countries freeze the Marcoses' assets within their
territories, and observed:
Whether any confiscatory action by the Philippines will be entitled to credit in the
United States courts is a question for another day, but it is surely a question that
will be governed by federal law within the original jurisdiction of the court under
section 1331 of the Judicial Code."
Although the complaint relied on a theory closer to a state law claim for
conversion than on federal common law, the court held that "an action
brought by a foreign government against its former head of state arises
under federal common law because of the necessary implications of such
an action for United States foreign relations."1°7 Even if the federal
interest was not strong enough to entirely displace any state cause of
action, the court held that the state-created cause of action at least
contained a federal issue. Furthermore, regardless of whether the overall
claim involved state or federal law, the decision to honor or ignore a
foreign government's request to freeze property within U.S. borders was
necessarily a federal matter.'08
Unlike the cases discussed earlier, the federal court's subject
matter jurisdiction in Republic of the Philippines was contingent upon
some aspect of the plaintiff's claim involving federal law. To conclude
that federal jurisdiction obtained, the court reasoned as follows: Suits
between foreign governments and their former rulers, or involving
requests by foreign governments to freeze such rulers' assets in the
United States, involve federal interests. The rule of law applied to
101. Id. at 348-49.
102. The Marcoses and their agents did not appear in the action. The suit was defended by
the corporate owners of record of the properties in question and by persons connected with those
corporations.
103. Id. at 352.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 353.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 354.
108. Id. The court went on to evaluate the overall claim under both state law and federal
common law. Id. at 355-56.
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resolve suits involving federal interests must be federal law. Thus, such
suits arise under federal law, not because they depend on any existing
federal rule, but because whatever rule the court applies to decide the
case becomes federal law by virtue of its use to decide this necessarily
federal case. The court of appeals decision, however, provides no
justification for automatically treating cases involving interests of the
sort at issue in Republic of the Philippines as a matter exclusively for
federal law.
Grynberg Production Corp. v. British Gas, P.L. C. " goes even
further than Republic of the Philippines in using the "foreign means
federal" approach. The defendant British Gas had agreed to jointly
develop an oil field in Kazakhstan with the plaintiff but reneged after it
received an oil-drilling concession from the Kazakh government 10
The plaintiff sued for breach of contract and fraud and sought, in the
alternative, specific performance of the agreement to develop the oil
field in Kazakhstan, an injunction requiring British Gas to transfer the
oil drilling concession to the plaintiff, or money damages to compensate
for the defendant's conversion of the plaintiff's alleged rights to drill in
the oil field."' The court upheld removal to federal court even though
diversity jurisdiction did not apply. It held that a question of federal law
was presented because the court would have to nullify the concession
granted by the Kazakh government in order to grant the specific
performance remedy, and only the federal common law of foreign
relations could authorize a judicial remedy that would override an
independent state's determinations regarding its own natural
resources."' Similarly, the conversion claim depended on the illegality
of defendant's receipt of the concession, and only federal law could
support a determination that Kazakhstan's decision to award the
concession was illegal." 3 Finally, the court reasoned that the
injunction claim depended on federal law" 4 because a number of the
obvious defenses to the plaintiff's claim for an injunction involved
federal common law (for example, the act of state doctrine), and the
plaintiff would be required to refute these defenses under Texas law." 5
While the reasoning in this case is doubtful," 6 it clearly stands for the
109. 817 F. Supp. at 1338.
110. Id. at 1346.
111. Id. at 1358.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1359-60.
114. Id. at 1353 (citing Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921)).
115. Id. at 1360-63.
116. The court's first basis for determining the existence of federal jurisdiction is its
conclusion that only federal law could permit it to nullify the agreement between British Gas and
Kazakhstan. ld. at 1358-59. Its second basis for jurisdiction likewise depends on the argument that
only federal law could render unlawful an independent state's determinations regarding its own
natural resources. Id. at 1360. Although the court relies on Sabbatino for the proposition that
"claims raising questions of foreign relations are incorporated into federal common law," id. at
1355, the court identifies no authority supporting the proposition that federal law would either
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proposition that a case involves federal common law when it contains
some international element, even though the plaintiff makes no claim
based on customary international law.
The plaintiff in Grynberg at least challenged the legality of a
foreign government's actions. In Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc. ,"t the court
held that the federal common law of international relations was involved
even though no action by any foreign government was at issue.
Ecuadoran citizens brought the suit against Texaco for environmental
damage allegedly effected in Ecuador. The court held that the case
involved the relationship between the governments of the United States
and Ecuador although the plaintiffs and the defendant were private
parties.' Specifically, the court stressed that the defendant's
operations were highly regulated by the government of Ecuador and
were carried out on government land."' It also noted that the trust
fund for medical monitoring sought by the plaintiffs would effectively
supplant the Ecuadoran Health Ministry. 20 Moreover, the Ecuadoran
government had strongly protested the bringing of the suit.' Thus,
the case necessarily involved the relationship between the government
of the United States, through the court, and the government of Ecuador,
and federal common law governed.'22 The court then dismissed the
case on comity of nations andforum non conveniens grounds." 2
Sequihua is an example of the breadth of some courts' claims
regarding the reach of federal jurisdiction in cases with international
elements. Such claims are far from uncontroversial, however. As the
next section will demonstrate, numerous decisions of state courts, as
well as some federal decisions, reject this expansive view.
B. Arguments and Authority Inconsistent with a Broad Federal
Common Law of Foreign Relations
permit nullifying the Kazakh concession grant or address the legality of that grant. Indeed, the
argument that federal law could provide relief on either theory appears so weak as to trigger the
rule requiring dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of claims ostensibly based on the
presence of a federal question when a federal claim is plainly insubstantial. See CHARLES A.
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3564 (2d ed. 1984). The Court's third
justification for its assertion ofjurisdiction is hard to understand. It depends on the conclusion that
Texas law governed the availability of injunctive relief. Grynberg, 817 F. Supp. at 1359, 1361-62.
However, because the court also holds that the plaintiffs right to the remedies it sought was
dependent on federal law, id. at 1366, it would seem that the relevant standard for injunctive relief
would be federal, not state. In other words, if the court's first and second arguments for federal
subject matter jurisdiction are correct, the third is wrong; if the third is correct, the first and
second are wrong.
117. 847 F. Supp. at 61.
118. Id. at 62.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 63.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 62-63.
123. Id. at 63-65.
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The lower federal court decisions described above raise a number
of problems. First, they lack any clear basis in principle. Moreover, a
number of state and federal decisions conflict with their "foreign means
federal" reasoning. Finally, these cases depend on a view of exclusive
federal authority over cases touching on foreign relations that is
contradicted by federal statutes.
To argue that federal common law must govern whenever a case
implicates the international relations of the United States is to provide
a basis for taking all cases with international elements out of the state
courts. This result is most obvious with cases in which foreign
governments or their officials are parties, or those in which foreign
nationals are litigating over transactions that took place abroad. Yet even
litigation involving transactions carried out entirely in the United States
could affect international relations if the cases involve foreign
participants who are unhappy with the suits' outcome. Similarly, foreign
governments would be concerned about suits between Americans
involving transactions in their states.
So sweeping a reduction of state court authority is hard to justify.
The "foreign means federal" cases fail to specify what effects these
cases would have on foreign relations that require their adjudication in
a federal forum, nor do they explain how limiting state court jurisdiction
will avoid these problems. The only justifications they offer for their
results are references to Sabbatino and Zschernig. Sabbatino, to be sure,
holds that federal law must govern some matters involving foreign
relations, and Zschernig establishes the corollary that some state actions
affecting foreign states and litigants unconstitutionally invade federal
foreign relations authority. Neither case, however, provides much
guidance as to the boundaries of the rule it asserts, and the cases
described in Section A likewise lack all but conclusory justifications.
Not only do these federal cases fail to justify their limitations on
state court jurisdiction, but they also ignore a number of state and lower
federal court decisions holding states competent to apply their policies
to some subjects touching on international relations. For example, J.
Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd. 24 held that in the
absence of a "present policy of the executive branch of the United States
Government," a state could apply its own policies regarding
acquiescence in the confiscatory and discriminatory acts of a foreign
government.'" Therefore, the state court could hear a suit for a
Ugandan bank's failure to honor the irrevocable letter of credit it had
issued to the plaintiffs where the Ugandan government had ordered the
action.' 26 The court's reliance on the policy of the state, rather than
federal policy, conflicts sharply with the reasoning in Republic of Iraq
124. 333 N.E.2d 168 (N.Y. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975).
125. Id. at 173 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
126. Id. at 170-71.
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v. First National City Bank. 27 Similarly, the holdings in Gilbertson
and Tahan, suggesting that the enforceability of foreign court judgments
is a matter of federal law, conflict with other federal court holdings. 12s
In Exxon Corp. v. Choo,' 9 a state court also applied its own law
to an international case involving forum non conveniens, contrary to the
holding in Chick Kam Choo.'3 ' After the U.S. Supreme Court reversed
Chick Kam Choo on grounds unrelated to this Article, Exxon renewed
in a Texas state court its argument that, as the case involved maritime
law, federalforum non conveniens rules preempted those of Texas and
required dismissal of the case. By relying on American Dredging Co. v.
Miller,' a U.S. Supreme Court case involving purely domestic
entities, the Texas Supreme Court rejected this argument. 32 American
Dredging held that state courts hearing maritime cases were not obliged
to apply federal forum non conveniens doctrine, which the Supreme
Court described as a "supervening venue provision that does not bear
upon the substantive right to recover, and is not a rule upon which
maritime actors rely in making decisions about primary conduct." 33
Armed with this precedent, the Choo court held that federalforum non
conveniens doctrine did not preempt Texas law. It reasoned that:
since the Supreme Court has determined that forum non conveniens is not a
characteristic feature of general maritime law and that the application of state
forum non conveniens law would not materially disrupt a uniform or predictable
feature of general maritime law, the potential impact on international and
interstate maritime commerce is minimal."
While the court acknowledged that forum non conveniens "implicates
international accommodation and comity, " "' it also expressed doubt
that application of Texas law would interfere with international relations
or commerce because the parties to the case were an alien private citizen
and American and Liberian corporations.136
State courts have also rejected the "foreign means federal"
principle applied in Republic of the Philippines. In Islamic Republic of
127. See supra text accompanying notes 87-91.
128. See, e.g., Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974). The case at bar was an effort by Curacao to give effect
to the Curacao court's enforcement order. The plaintiffs originally sued Solitron for breach of a
contract to establish a business operation in Curacao. The plaintiffs obtained an arbitration award
against Solitron that was enforced by a Curacao court. Id. at 1314-15; see also Ingersoll Milling
Machine Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1987). Granger turned on the enforceability of
an employment dispute judgment obtained by an employee of Ingersoll's Belgian subsidiary from
the Belgian courts. Id. at 682-84.
129. 881 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. 1994).
130. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
131. 114 S. Ct. 981 (1994).
132. Choo, 881 S.W.2d at 301.
133. American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. 988-89.
134. Choo, 881 S.W.2d at 306.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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Iran v. Pahlavi,' the New York Court of Appeals upheld a lower
court's dismissal of a suit brought by Iran against the former Shah and
his wife. Iran alleged that the Shah' had obtained vast sums of money
through bribery, embezzlement, and conversion, and sought to recover
those sums, assets purchased with those sums, and exemplary
damages."' 8 The court dismissed the suit based on its own
understanding of forum non conveniens without suggesting that federal
common law was in any way relevant.3 9 The court acknowledged the
absence of an alternative forum for the suit, which, under Gulf Oil v.
Gilbert," renders forum non conveniens unavailable. It observed,
however, that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee did
not require this view of forum non conveniens and therefore left the state
court free to take its own approach to the doctrine. 41 Thus, the court
applied state law even though the issues raised in the case had significant
foreign relations implications. Moreover, it rejected Iran's reading of the
Algiers Accords, 42 which Iran claimed were a U.S. Government
guarantee of the right to bring actions against, the Shah in American
courts. 14 Even more significantly, the court questioned the federal
government's authority to make such a guarantee in accordance with
principles of federalism because this dispute did not involve an area of
clear federal authority, such as international claims. 1"
The reasoning in Pahlavi is not unique. Other cases have applied
state law where no federal court had specifically labelled a matter as
federal law.'4 Such cases are hard to reconcile with the emerging
137. 467 N.E.2d 245 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985).
138. Id. at 246-47. Although Iran v. Pahlavi and Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos both
involved foreign government efforts to recover assets allegedly stolen by deposed rulers, Republic
of the Philippines involved property clearly within the court's jurisdiction, while the assets in
Pahlavi were scattered. Although this distinction might justify different results on the merits, it
does not demonstrate that one case had more or less potential to affect U.S. foreign relations.
Similarly, in a California case involving a foreign government agency's effort to obtain relief from
problems allegedly caused by a foreign ruler's dishonesty, the state court applied state law to a
dispositive procedural issue, and nothing in the opinion suggests that the court saw the case's
foreign relations aspects as raising any federal issue. See Philippine Export & Foreign Loan Guar.
Corp. v. Chuidian, 267 Cal. Rptr. 457 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
139. 467 N.E.2d at 247.
140. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
141. 467 N.E.2d at 246-50 (noting that U.S. Supreme Court had never held forum non
conveniens required under Fourteenth Amendment).
142. Id. at 247, 251-52.
143. Id. at 252.
144. Id. at 251-53; see also Chuidian, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 457 (upholding, without reference
to any controlling federal common law, trial court's refusal to vacate stipulated judgment of
Philippine court).
145. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the Employees' Retirement Sys. of the City of Baltimore
v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 746 (Md. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Luban v. Mayor
of Baltimore City, 492 U.S. 1093 (1990) (upholding Baltimore ordinances against investment in
South Africa, distinguishing Zschernig as proscribing only "extensivejudicial scrutiny and criticism
of foreign governments"). The result of this case is somewhat surprising. The court's effort to
distinguish Zschemig seems disingenuous, because it characterizes the purpose of the ordinances
as "ensur[ing] that the City's pension funds would not be invested in a manner that was morally
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"foreign means federal" approach discussed in Section A. They are,
however, consistent with holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Several Supreme Court decisions post-dating Zschernig suggest that
cases affecting international relations are not necessarily governed by
federal law. Day & Zimmerman v. Challoner, " for instance, held that
"[a] federal court in a diversity case is not free to engraft onto . . . state
[conflicts of law] rules exceptions or modifications which may commend
themselves to the federal court, but which have not commended
themselves to the State in which the federal court sits."147 This was so
even though the state conflicts rule would have led to the application of
the law of a foreign country that, in the opinion of the court of appeals,
had no interest in the controversy. 4' Clearly, the Court considered the
international element of the case to be irrelevant. Similarly, in DeCanas
v. Bicat49 the Supreme Court upheld as constitutional a California
statute restricting the employment of illegal aliens' despite the federal
government's exclusive authority over immigration. It rejected the
proposition that any state statute dealing with aliens was ipso facto a
regulation of immigration t"' and held that, even if the statute had
"some purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration,"152 it
was not an unconstitutional exercise of state power absent some
preemptive action by Congress. 3 Finding none, it upheld the statute,
but remanded to the lower court for its determination whether the statute
would somehow directly interfere with the operation of federal
offensive to many Baltimore residents," id. at 746. This purpose would appear to render the
ordinances more intrusive into the federal domain than the statute in Zschernig, which, even though
it was facially innocuous, was held unconstitutional because it provided state judges with the
opportunity to make derogatory comments about foreign governments. The Baltimore ordinances,
in contrast, were a continuing, formalized criticism of a foreign state. Trustees v. Baltimore, then,
is a very narrow reading of Zschernig. Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903
(3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991), also reads Zschernig narrowly. In that case,
a Canadian plaintiff challenged a Pennsylvania statute imposing a "Buy American" requirement
on suppliers of products for public works projects carried out by any Pennsylvania governmental
unit. Id. at 904-05. The court rejected the argument that the statute unconstitutionally interfered
with the federal foreign affairs power. Id. at 913-14. It distinguished Zschernig by noting that the
statute provided no opportunity for state officials to comment on, or base their decisions upon, the
nature of any foreign government and did not permit selective application. Id. at 913. The court
acknowledged that such procurement restrictions might draw international scrutiny and become the
subject of trade negotiations but held such possibilities insufficient to justify ruling the statute
unconstitutional. Id. Reasoning that Congress had recently refused to preempt such trade
restrictions and had demonstrated an interest in eliminating them only on a reciprocal basis, the
court concluded that striking down Pennsylvania's statute would amount to an inappropriate judicial
redirection of federal foreign trade policy. Id. at 906-07, 913-14.
146. 423 U.S. 3 (1975) (per curiam).
147. Id. at 4.
148. Id. at 3-4.
149. 424 U.S. 351 (1976)
150. Id. at 352. The California statute prohibited the employment of aliens where their
employment would adversely affect U.S. residents.
151. Id. at 352-55.
152. Id. at 355.
153. Id. at 355-56.
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immigration law.'54
The Supreme Court also limited the scope of the "foreign means
federal" approach in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environmental
Tectonics Corp., International.'55 In this case, an unsuccessful bidder
on a Nigerian government contract sued the successful bidder in federal
court, claiming that the successful bidder had bribed those awarding the
contract.'- 6 Although the plaintiff did not seek to disturb the contract
itself, in order to prevail it would have had to establish facts rendering
the Nigerian Government's award of the contract void under Nigerian
law."5 7 As amicus, the federal government agreed with the defendant
that the Court should take an expansive view of the act of state
doctrine - the issue should be a case's potential to "touch on 'national
nerves,'" and not merely whether the court would have to sit in
judgment on the official acts of a foreign sovereign in its own
territory. 15
8
The Court rejected the federal government's proposed broadening
of the act of state doctrine and ruled:
The short of the matter is this: Courts in the United States have the power, and
ordinarily the obligation, to decide cases and controversies properly presented to
them. The act of state doctrine does not establish an exception for cases and
controversies that may embarrass foreign governments, but merely requires that,
in the process of deciding, the acts of foreign sovereigns taken within their own
jurisdictions shall be deemed valid.159
Kirkpatrick, then, makes clear that a case's potential for embarrassing
a foreign government, thereby affecting American international relations,
is relevant only to the actual invalidation of an official foreign act. If no
such invalidation is at issue, Kirkpatrick holds, any fallout from the case
is irrelevant. It is particularly noteworthy that the Court, in declaring
this standard, refers not to "Courts of the United States" but to "Courts
in the United States," thereby extending its pronouncement to state as
well as federal courts.
Another Supreme Court case bearing on this matter is the recently
decided Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California.'6
In that case, the Court upheld California's method of taxing corporations
that did business both internationally and in California.' 6' Considering
whether California's tax system impaired "federal uniformity in an area
154. Id. at 356-65.
155. 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
156. Id. at 401-02.
157. Id. at 406.
158. Id. at 406-08.
159. Id. at 409.
160. 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994).
161. Id. at 2271-72.
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where federal uniformity is essential," 62 the Court held that when the
only argument for the unconstitutionality of a particular state practice
would be that it impaired the ability of the United States to speak with
"one voice" in matters involving international commerce, passive
indications by Congress that the state practice in question was
unobjectionable provided an adequate basis for upholding the
practice.163 The Court reached its conclusion, moreover, despite
undisputed evidence that California's taxation scheme had aroused great
opposition from foreign governments.164
The results in Day & Zimmerman, DeCanas, Kirkpatrick, and
Barclays Bank suggest some limits on the reach of the "foreign means
federal" approach. Sabbatino could be read as ousting state law from all
cases with the potential for causing foreign policy problems for the
United States. Zschernig implied that the states were completely
excluded from activities bearing on foreign relations; it perhaps also
implied that this exclusion was beyond the power of Congress to affect.
Day & Zimmerman, however, clearly indicates that the mere presence
of some international element in a case does not require the application
of a federal rule. Similarly, DeCanas takes pains to stress the limitations
on the federal government's power to deal with aliens despite the
relationship of that subject to foreign affairs. Kirkpatrick establishes that
a case's implications for relations with a foreign government will affect
the court's authority to entertain the case only in limited circumstances,
whether the court is state or federal. Finally, Barclays Bank proceeds on
the principle that Congressional acquiescence in a state practice affecting
the commercial aspect of foreign relations is sufficient to validate that
practice even if its negative effect on American dealings with other
countries is demonstrable. Taken together, these cases, along with Clark
v. Allen, suggest caution in concluding that a state practice with some
impact on international relations necessarily trespasses on an exclusively
federal preserve. Additionally, because federal common law displaces
state law, they likewise undercut the broadest of the arguments
concerning the applicability of federal common law in this field. If the
states are competent to legislate on at least some matters with
international aspects and to hear in their courts cases with some potential
impact on foreign governments, then authority over those same matters
cannot be limited to federal lawmaking authorities, be they
Congressional or judicial. The matters thus cannot be controlled by
federal common law.
The foregoing discussion shows that state courts and some federal
courts have declined to see the federal common law of foreign relations
162. Id. at 2281 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448
(1979)).
163. Id. at 2282-84.
164. Id. at 2283-85 & 2285 n.22.
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as a body of law with unlimited reach. In addition to case law, federal
statutes assume state competence in some areas affecting foreign
relations. Congress has explicitly welcomed state activities affecting
foreign trade, for example.' Section 4001(a) of 15 U.S.C. provides:
The Congress finds that... those activities of State and local governmental
authorities which initiate, facilitate, or expand exports of goods and services can
be an important source for expansion of total United States exports, as well as for
experimentation in the development of innovative export programs keyed to local,
State, and regional economic needs . .. ."
Further, 15 U.S.C. § 4721, the statute establishing the United States and
Foreign Commercial Service, provides that the Service will "assistol the
coordination of the efforts of State and local agencies. .. which seek
to promote United States business interests abroad .. "167 Clearly,
Congress assumes the states will play a role in foreign trade, a role they
have eagerly accepted. For example, North Carolina maintains "foreign
office trade directors" in four foreign cities."'
Congress' acceptance of state activity that affects foreign
governments goes beyond the area of foreign trade. The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA")' 69 clearly envisions a state role in
suits by and against foreign countries - suits that arguably affect U.S.
foreign relations. Section 4 of the FSIA presupposes state court
involvement by explicitly stating that the standards of immunity
established by the FSIA are to apply in state as well as federal
courts.t"0 Congress' failure to confer exclusive federal jurisdiction in
all cases involving foreign governments or their instrumentalities
indicates its belief that state courts are competent to hear cases involving
foreign governments. Moreover, First National City Bank v. Banco para
el Comercio Exterior de Cuba"' and other cases have interpreted the
FSIA as requiring courts to apply state liability standards governing
private actors in cases where a foreign government defendant is not
immune and in which state law provides a rule of liability governing
private individuals." This statute, then, represents a Congressional
165. For a discussion of state and local government activity in the field of international trade,
see Jessica V. Carter, Note, The Role of Local Government in Foreign Trade: The Case of
Baltimore, 15 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 169 (1991).
166. 15 U.S.C. § 4001(a)(9) (1988).
167. 15 U.S.C. § 4721(b)(7) (Supp. V 1988).
168. State of North Carolina International Trade Division, Mission Statement 2 (May 4,
1994) (on file with author).
169. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, 1602-11 (1988)).
170. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1988).
171. 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
172. Id. at 620-21, 622 n.ll (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1606); accord Barkanic v. General
Admin. of CAAC, 923 F.2d 957, 959-60 (2d Cir. 1991); Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d
1419, 1425 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. dismissed, 497 U.S. 1058 (1990). The issue in Comerclo
Exterior de Cuba was whether the defendant, a corporation created and wholly owned by the
Cuban government butjuridically distinct from that government under Cuban law, was an alter ego
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judgment that the interests of the United States are consistent with state
law determinations regarding the liabilities of foreign countries when
those countries are not immune from suit.
The cases and statutes discussed in this Section demonstrate that
Congress and many courts reject the proposition that any activity
affecting foreign relations is forbidden to the states. Correspondingly,
they cut against the corollary of that proposition, that all law governing
any question affecting foreign relations is necessarily federal. To be
sure, no state seems inclined to go beyond certain limits. For example,
the New York courts struck down, as intrusions into the federal foreign
affairs power, efforts by local and state agencies to sanction South
African Airways for its refusal to carry travellers to South Africa who
had not obtained South African visas (which were denied to blacks)"
and to forbid newspapers from carrying ads for employment in South
Africa. 74 Similarly, the Illinois courts, again relying on the federal
government's exclusive authority over foreign relations, held
unconstitutional a statute denying dealers in South African coins a tax
exemption otherwise extended to dealers in rare coins. 7 5
There is, then, no real controversy over the Sabbatino and
Zschernig holdings at their core. It is their outer boundaries that remain
uncertain. Federal and state courts, along with Congress, have
envisioned considerable scope for the application of state law in matters
involving foreign relations. Thus, despite the decisions discussed in
Section A, federal courts do not have blanket authority to ignore state
law in cases with international elements.
The difficulties raised in this area, and those caused by the idea
that customary international law is federal common law, are not,
however, limited to doubtful and poorly considered displacements of
state authority by federal courts. Lower federal court decisions claiming
federal common law status for customary international law rest their
own subject matter jurisdiction on dubious authority. Part V examines
the justification for the proposition that this category of suits "arise[s]
under the laws of the United States."
of Cuba for purposes of a FSTA claim based on actions taken by Cuba. Comercio Exterior de
Cuba, 462 U.S. at 613-21. The Court held that federal law governed this question by analogizing
to Sabbatino. However, it distinguished this question from the issue of the source of liability in
FSIA actions. Id. at 622 n.11. Liu and Barkanic both hold that no federal liability rules exist for
FSIA cases, though Liu holds that federal law determines choice of law in such cases, 892 F.2d
at 1425-26, while Barkanic holds that state law must resolve choice of law questions in PSIA
cases, 923 F.2d at 959-61.
173. South African Airways v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 315 N.Y.S.2d 651
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
174. New York Times Co. v. City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 361 N.E.2d
963 (N.Y. 1977).
175. Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300 (Ill. 1986).
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V. JURISDICTIONAL AND RELATED PROBLEMS OF THE
FEDERALIZING APPROACH TO CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
7 6
Part III demonstrated that, taken to its extreme, the federalizing
approach to customary international law could displace state authority in
broad areas of law currently seen as the province of the states, but that
a number of state and federal courts have rejected this approach. This
Part focuses on the weaknesses of the jurisdictional reasoning in
Filartiga rather than on that decision's negative policy effects. As noted
above, Filartiga asserts that customary international law, which it
equates with the "law of nations," is within the federal courts' subject
matter jurisdiction as part of the "law of the United States."" As this
Part will demonstrate, however, Filartiga was wrongly decided for
several reasons. First, Filartiga misreads the authorities on which the
court bases its jurisdiction. Second, the court's result contradicts several
decisions of the Supreme Court that Filartiga does not address, let alone
distinguish. Finally, literal application of the Filartiga rule that
customary international law is federal common law would violate the
fundamental principle of separation of powers.
A. Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: Analysis
of Supporting Authority
Although Filartiga cites authority to support the argument that
customary international law is federal common law, the authorities cited
do not support that conclusion. Filartiga relies on two types of authority
to support its result: case law and the intentions of the Framers of the
Constitution, as described by Professor Dickinson. Each of these
elements of authority requires separate consideration.
1. Filartiga: Problems with Its Reading of the Case Law
Filartiga relies on two admiralty cases, The Nereide and The
Paquete Habana, to support its holding. These cases do not, however,
genuinely advance the court's argument. In the first place, a federal
court's subject matter jurisdiction in an admiralty case flows from
Article II's language permitting Congress to vest the federal courts with
admiralty jurisdiction, not from Article III's language regarding cases
arising under federal law. Admiralty cases therefore arise in a
completely different jurisdictional posture than Filartiga, where subject
matter jurisdiction does not exist unless the legal rules to be applied are
federal.
176. Much of the discussion in this section draws on Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive
Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1210-20, 1251-67 (1988).
177. See discussion of Filartiga, supra text accompanying notes 6-22.
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Moreover, the Filartiga decision finds no support in early federal
admiralty courts' occasional reliance on customary international law
because that reliance reflects a pre-positivistic view of a court's
relationship to the law it applied rather than an assumption that
customary international law was federal law. During the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries, American lawyers and judges assumed
that federal courts could look to law from three different sources: the
law of the United States; local law (i.e., the peculiar local rules adopted
by states through legislation or judicial decision on subjects appropriate
for local governance); and general law, the body of unwritten law
embracing subjects of general interest and sometimes also called
common law, or the law of nations. 7 1
Importantly, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century lawyers determined
the content of this general law using a different approach than do
modern American lawyers. Instead of accepting positivist assumptions
about the nature of law as an artifact created by judges, jurists of this
period saw the content of the general law as an object for "discovery"
by judicial inquiry and reflection. As a result, courts did not believe that
when they claimed jurisdiction over and decided a class of cases, they
also created the law applied to those cases. 79 Judges might discover
law by looking to various sources, including decisions by other judges,
but general law (common law, law of nations) was natural law, not a
product of judicial creation.
It has been clear at least since 1812 that federal courts are not
general law courts. The Supreme Court's determination that federal
courts lack jurisdiction to hear criminal cases alleging only uncodified
offenses under the common law reflects this distinction between the
courts' applying and creating law. That point was established in United
States v. Hudson and Goodwin,80 where the Court based its
conclusion primarily on the bad fit between the "very definite" character
of the common law of crimes on the one hand, and the precise, limited
delineation of the federal courts' jurisdiction on the other."' The
Supreme Court adhered to the reasoning of Hudson and Goodwin in
United States v. Coolidge; indeed, though Hudson and Goodwin was
a criminal case, it continues to be cited as authority for the general
178. See Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United
States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 26-31 (1952); William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law
and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1513, 1517 (1984).
179. See Fletcher, supra note 178, at 1517-18; Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common
Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1309-10 (1985); see also Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842) (noting that court decisions are only evidence of law and that general
principles of commercial jurisprudence trump decisions of local tribunals, which "cannot furnish
positive rules").
180. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
181. Id. at 32-34.
182. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816).
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proposition that federal courts are not common law courts. 83
This distinction between application and creation of the general law
was also reflected in admiralty cases - admiralty and maritime law and
what we would now call customary international law both being seen as
elements of the general law or law of nations. 84 This latter point is
significant for two reasons. First, because admiralty law and customary
international law were both elements of the law of nations, an admiralty
court applying an international law rule in an admiralty case was
employing a body of law closely connected to the law it was expected
to apply. Second, admiralty courts saw admiralty law, not as an element
of the "law of the United States," but as a body of law distinct from that
of the United States. ' Because admiralty law was part of the law of
nations, admiralty courts, by implication, also saw the law of nations as
distinct from the law of the United States.
The distinction between admiralty law and the law of the United
States was not merely a matter of background jurisprudential thinking;
it governed judicial decisions. In American Insurance Co. v. Canter, '
the Supreme Court faced a challenge to the jurisdiction of an inferior
court established by the Legislative Council of the Florida Territory.
That court had exercised an element of admiralty jurisdiction, and the
case turned on whether the Legislative Council had the authority to vest
such jurisdiction in an inferior court that it had created.8 7 Resolution
of that question depended on the proper construction of the federal act
of Congress establishing the Florida Territory and the territory's
superior courts.' Those courts' jurisdiction, in the language of the
act, extended to "all cases arising under the laws and Constitution of the
United States." 8 9
The Court held that cases in admiralty were not cases arising under
the laws and Constitution of the United States for two reasons.' 90
First, in delineating the areas of federal jurisdiction, Article III listed
cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States
separately from admiralty and maritime cases. Speaking through Chief
Justice Marshall, the Court observed that "[tihe Constitution certainly
contemplates these as . . . distinct classes of cases; and if they are
183. See, e.g., Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981).
184. See Dickinson, supra note 178, at 26-31; Fletcher, supra note 178, at 1517.
185. GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 45 (2d ed. 1975).
186. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
187. Id. at 540-43. Resolution of that question depended on the proper construction of the
act of Congress establishing the Florida Territory. See id. at 541-44. That act established superior
courts in the territory, and it was undisputed that the action of the Legislative Council in conferring
admiralty jurisdiction upon the inferior court was valid unless the act of Congress had granted that
jurisdiction exclusively to the superior courts. Id. at 543.
188. See id. at 541-44.
189. Id. at 545. Thus, the case came down to whether Congress's grant to the superior courts
of jurisdiction over cases arising under the laws of the United States included a grant of admiralty
jurisdiction. Id.
190. See id.
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distinct, the grant of jurisdiction over one of them does not confer
jurisdiction over [the other]."191 Second, the Court observed that
admiralty cases do not, in fact, arise under the Constitution or laws of
the United States. Admiralty law pre-existed U.S. law, and courts facing
admiralty and maritime cases merely applied that law to the cases before
them.192 Admiralty courts, that is, were not applying the "laws of the
United States" when they decided cases; they were applying one element
of the general law. 193
Canter is significant for several reasons. First, in light of the
connection in early nineteenth-century jurisprudence between admiralty
and the law of nations, to hold that the former was not part of the law
of the United States was necessarily to hold the same for the latter.
Second, Canter demonstrates that a federal court's application of a body
of law does not establish that the body of law is part of the law of the
United States; federal courts of appropriate jurisdiction certainly applied
admiralty law even though, according to Canter, it was not "law of the
United States." Thus, the fact that a federal court applied international
law in a case says nothing about whether that court saw international law
as federal law.
How does all this bear on Filartiga? That opinion relied in part on
The Paquete Habana and The Nereide to support its result. Yet the
federal courts' jurisdiction in those two cases did not depend on the
federal nature of the law they applied. Jurisdiction existed because they
were admiralty matters. Nor do these cases support Filartiga's result due
to their application of international law because Canter demonstrates that
a federal court's application of a body of law does not render that body
of law federal. Furthermore, Canter necessarily implies that a federal
court with jurisdiction can apply the appropriate body of law even if that
law is not federal - admiralty courts apply admiralty law after all, even
though, per Canter, it is not federal law. Viewed according to this logic,
the seemingly unequivocal language in The Paquete Habana and The
Nereide equating customary international law with federal law is reduced
to mere dictum; such a conclusion was irrelevant both to the courts'
jurisdiction and to their capacity to apply international law.
Apart from the foregoing, the language upon which Filartiga relied
surely was not intended to suggest, even in dictum, that the law of
nations, or customary international law, is the law of the United States.
For instance, Filartiga quotes The Nereide to the effect that "United
States courts are 'bound by the law of nations, which is a part of the law
191. Id.
192. Id. at 545-46.
193. See also The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187-88 (1871) (treating "law of the sea"
as element of "law of nations"); G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and International Law:
The Piracy Cases, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 727, 728 (1989) (arguing that Marshall court viewed
international law as related to natural law and distinct from laws of United States).
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of the land.'" '94 The opinion in The Nereide, however, was written by
Chief Justice Marshall, the very same justice who addressed the status
of the law of nations in relation to federal law in Canter. Given his
conclusion in Canter that admiralty cases did not arise under the laws of
the United States, it seems unlikely that in The Nereide Marshall meant
to assert that the law of nations was federal law. Moreover, if Marshall
had truly meant to label customary international law as the "law of the
United States" in The Nereide, he would have used language much more
precise than the phrase "the law of the land." Marshall, of all judges,
hardly would have employed vague terms to demarcate the jurisdiction
of the federal courts.
Filartiga also cites language from The Paquete Habana to support
its decision:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by
the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose,
where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations ....
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163, 164, 214, 215.' g9
This language, however, must be read within the context of the entire
opinion, which indicates that the Court never intended to address
whether international law was "law of the United States." First, in
answering an objection to its appellate jurisdiction in the case, the Court
in The Paquete Habana carefully analyzed the six grounds for
jurisdiction under the relevant statute.'9 6 The Court found a basis for
its jurisdiction in the second, 1 7 the case being on appeal following a
"final sentenceol and decreed in prize causes." '98 The Court also
referred to the fourth, fifth, and sixth grounds for jurisdiction, 99
which in the Court's words "all relate[d] to what are commonly called
Federal questions ...." This language implies that the Court did not
see the basis for its own jurisdiction, the clause dealing with prize
jurisdiction, as involving a federal question. Of course, this implication
is unsurprising given Canter's holding that admiralty cases do not arise
under federal law.
Other elements of the language used in The Paquete Habana
suggest that the Court never purported to characterize customary
194. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887 (quoting The Nereide, 13 U.S. at 422).
195. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
196. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 826, 827-28, repealed by Act of June
27, 1988, §§ 2, 5, 102 Stat. 662, 662, 663 (circuit courts of appeals and federal jurisdiction).
197. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 686.
198. § 5, 26 Stat. at 827.
199. Id. at 828. These situations included cases that involved the construction or application
of the Constitution, the validity or construction of any treaty, or the constitutionality of federal or
state laws.
200. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 683.
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international law as federal law. First, to describe customary
international law as "part of our law" is extraordinarily imprecise
language for a court to use when referring to a matter relevant to its
jurisdiction. Moreover, the reference to "courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction" is puzzling. What courts would not be courts of appropriate
jurisdiction if customary international law were federal law? After all,
as noted above, if international law were part of the common or general
law, state courts could certainly hear cases involving it. If it were also
part of federal law, federal courts could likewise always hear
international law cases as long as the amount in controversy was
sufficient. Of course, if international law were not federal law, the
jurisdictional qualification makes more sense, as federal courts could
then apply international law only in diversity cases or, for the reasons
discussed above, by reason of the grant of admiralty jurisdiction in
Article III.
Finally, the Paquete Habana's citation to Hilton v. Guyot
reinforces the conclusion that the Court did not mean to suggest that
international law was federal law. The plaintiffs in Hilton, aliens and
French citizens, had sued to enforce a French court judgment against
certain New York citizens. The issue for the Supreme Court was
whether to enforce the judgment of the French court. 201 The language
from Hilton cited in The Paquete Habana was as follows:
International law, in its widest and most comprehensive sense - including not
only questions of right between nations, governed by what has been appropriately
called the law of nations; but also questions arising under what is usually called
private international law, or the conflict of laws, and concerning the rights of
persons within the territory and dominion of one nation, by reason of acts, private
or public, done within the dominions of another nation - is part of our law, and
must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice, as often as such
questions are presented in litigation between man and man, duty submitted to
their determination.'
This language, however, surely cannot mean that conflicts of law
questions arise under federal law. Only three years earlier, in
Huntington v. Attrill,03 the Supreme Court had characterized the
question of whether the courts of one state are obliged to enforce the
penal laws of another as one of "international law."2 It labelled this
international law issue as one of "general jurisprudence," and went on
to hold:
If a suit on the original liability under the statute of one State is brought in a
court of another State, the Constitution and laws of the United States have not
authorized its decision upon such a question to be reviewed by this ourt. ...
201. Id. at 227-28.
202. Id. at 163, cited in The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
203. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
204. Id. at 683.
34 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 20: 1
But if the original liability has passed into judgment in one State, the courts of
another State, when asked to enforce it, are bound by the Constitution and laws
of the United States to give full faith and credit to that judgment, and if they do
not, their decision ... may be reviewed and reversed by this court .... The
essential nature and real foundation of a cause of action, indeed, are not changed
by recovering judgment upon it .... The difference is only in the appellate
jurisdiction of this court in the one case or in the other.20S
The Huntington Court thus effectively held that questions of
"international law," at least in what would now be called its conflicts of
law aspect, do not involve the "laws of the United States." The Court
had jurisdiction in that case only because it contained a question under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Justice Gray, who authored both
opinions, is unlikely to have intended the language in Hilton, which also
raised a conflicts of law issue, to overrule Huntington sub silentio. Thus,
when Justice Gray referred to international law as "part of our law" in
Hilton, he could not have intended to label it "federal law." Further, if
this is true, Gray's use of the same phrase in The Paquete Habana, in
explicit reliance upon Hilton, surely was not meant to confer upon public
international law the status of federal law.2"s
Aside from the admiralty cases just discussed, Filartiga also relied
on Ware v. Hylton,2 7 which simply does not support the proposition
that customary international law is the law of the United States. The trial
court in Ware derived its jurisdiction from the fact that the plaintiff was
an alien and the defendants were citizens of an American state. 208
Whether customary international law was federal law therefore was not
before the Court. Second, what was before the Court was the treaty
between the United States and Great Britain that ended the Revolutionary
War; therefore, any references in the case to the law of nations were in
the context of treaty construction. The case simply does not address the
argument that questions of customary international law are questions of
federal law.
In addition, Filartiga's reliance on United States v. Smith2l
provides no support for the idea that customary international law is
federal law. In Smith, the Court upheld as constitutional a criminal
statute for piracy despite claims that the statute failed to define "piracy"
205. Id. (citations omitted).
206. Huntington's determination that conflicts questions are not matters of federal law
continues to be the rule. Day & Zimmerman, see supra notes 146-148 and accompanying text,
illustrates this. In that case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding of Klaxon that federal courts
sitting in diversity must apply the conflicts rules of the states in which they sit. Conflicts rules may
thus be "part of our law," according to Hilton, but they are still not federal law under Day &
Zimnerman. The PaqueteHabana's description of customary international law as "part of our law"
therefore does not indicate that customary international law is federal law, and such a conclusion
appears even less likely when that case is situated against the background of Justice Gray's earlier
opinions in Huntington and Hilton.
207. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199 (1796).
208. See id. at 221.
209. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
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clearly.21 The Court rejected this argument in holding that the term
"piracy" had a well established meaning:
Et]he common law, too, recognizes and punishes piracy as an offence, not against
its own municipal code, but as an offence against the law of nations, (which is
a part of the common law,) as an offence against the universal law of society, a
pirate being deemed an enemy of the human race.
21
'
This quotation does not relate to, let alone support, the proposition that
the "law of nations" is part of the laws of the United States. The Court
based its jurisdiction solely on the federal statute. Indeed, when it asserts
that the law of nations is part of the common law, the Court is actually
refuting this proposition because, as the Court had held, the common
law is distinct from the law of the United States. Interpreting Smith to
mean that the law of nations is part of federal law is to ignore Hudson
and Goodwin and Coolidge.2"2 Filartiga hence must look elsewhere for
support.
2. Filartiga and the Views of the Framers
The Filartiga court claims to have support from the Constitution's
Framers, or more precisely, from Professor Dickinson's description of
their views. Filartiga quotes Dickinson for the propositions that "the
Law of Nations is a part of the law of the land to be ascertained and
administered, like any other, in the appropriate case" z"3 and that "one
of the principal defects of the Confederation that our Constitution* was
intended to remedy was the central government's inability to 'cause
infractions of treaties or of the law of nations, to be punished.' '214
The court's reliance on Professor Dickinson is problematic.
Dickinson uses the term "law of nations" as a synonym for "general
law" or "common law."215 Yet he himself makes clear that Hudson
and Goodwin and Coolidge establish that questions involving the
"common law" do not arise under the law of the United States. 216 In
other words, Professor Dickinson himself effectively acknowledges that
the Supreme Court rejected his view of the relationship between the
"law of nations" and the laws of the United States. Moreover, his
definition of the law of nations would bring subjects traditionally
considered general law within federal law. Thus, under his analysis,
210. Id. at 158-62.
211. id. at 161.
212. See supra notes 180-183 and accompanying text.
213. Dickinson, supra note 178, at 27, quoted in Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 886.
214. 630 F.2d at 886 (quoting Dickinson, supra note 178, at 27) (some internal quotation
marks omitted).
215. Compare Dickinson, supra note 178, at 26-33 (explaining law of nations) with Fletcher,
supra note 178, at 1517-21 (explaining concept of general common law).
216. Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United
States, II, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 792, 792-95 (1953).
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Swift v. Tyson,217 holding that federal courts were free to ignore state
decisions on matters of commercial law, was rightly decided, or rather
erred by failing to label commercial law as federal law and by implying
that state courts were not obliged to follow federal commercial law
decisions. Of course, if Swift was right, then Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins2M' is thrown into doubt - and if Erie is doubtful, so is much
modern federal jurisprudence.
It is also instructive to consider Professor Dickinson's explanation
for the Supreme Court's rejection of the link between federal law and
customary international law which he believes would have been correct.
He attributes this narrow understanding of the reach of the law of
nations to "partisanship."2 9 This characterization identifies the second
problem with Filartiga's reliance on the "views" of the Framers - the
disparity of views among the Framers as to the meaning of "the laws of
the United States." As Professor Jay has carefully demonstrated,
American public figures were sharply divided over the proper extent of
federal jurisdiction. The conflict concerned the federal courts' authority
to apply not merely customary international law, but the common law
generally."2 While many took an expansive view of the common law
jurisdiction of the federal courts, others feared that such a broad grant
of jurisdiction to the federal courts would dangerously increase the
federal government's authority because it was assumed that federal
government authority was coextensive with that of the federal
courts. 22t In any case, the members of the founding generation were
hardly of one mind on this subject.
Even the authors of The Federalist disagreed on this issue. In The
Federalist, Number Three, Jay argues in favor of a strong federal
government by asserting:
[uinder the national government, treaties and articles of treaties, as well
as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense and executed in the
same manner - whereas adjudications on the same points and questions in
thirteen States, or in three or four confederacies, will not always accord or be
consistent; and that, as well from the variety of independent courts and judges
appointed by different and independent governments as from the different local
laws and interests which may affect and influence them.'
This language certainly suggests that Jay favored the federal courts'
jurisdiction over cases involving the law of nations.
In contrast, The Federalist, Number Eighty, which focuses solely
217. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 179 (1842).
218. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
219. Dickinson, supra note 216, at 792-95.
220. See Stewart Jay, Origins of the Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
1003, 1019-13; see also Smith, 18 U.S. at 161 (stating that law of nations is "part of the common
law").
221. Jay, supra note 220, at 1090-91.
222. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 43 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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on the jurisdiction of the federal courts, offers Hamilton's somewhat
circumscribed view of federal jurisdiction over matters of customary
international law. He wrote:
It seems scarcely to admit of controversy, that the judiciary authority of
the Union ought to extend to these several descriptions of cases. 1st, to all those
which arise out of the laws of the United States, passed in pursuance of their just
and constitutional powers of legislation; 2nd, to all those which concern the
execution of the provisions expressly contained in the articles of Union; 3rd, to
all those in which the United States are a party; 4th, to all those which involve
the PEACE of the CONFEDERACY, whether they relate to the intercourse between
the United States and foreign nations or to that between the States themselves;
5th, to all those which originate on the high seas, and are of admiralty or
maritime jurisdiction; and lastly, to all those in which the State tribunals cannot
be supposed to be impartial and unbiased.'
The fourth category Hamilton includes could suggest that he saw the
Constitution as permitting federal jurisdiction over cases involving
customary international law. His argument later in Number Eighty, that
federal jurisdiction in cases where foreigners are parties would reduce
the likelihood of conflict with foreign states arising from judicial
maltreatment of their nationals, further supports this reading. 4
The final portion of Hamilton's argument, however, completely
refutes these impressions. He demonstrates there how the allocations of
jurisdiction in Article III accommodate each of his six classes of
cases.' According to Hamilton, Article III's grant of jurisdiction over
cases arising under the laws of the United States corresponds only to the
first two of his six categories of cases.226 He did not believe that the
laws of the United States provision extends to jurisdiction involving
international law cases. He refers to his fourth category of cases only in
reference to grants of jurisdiction over cases involving treaties,
ambassadors, public ministers and consuls, controversies between two
or more states, controversies between a state and citizens of another
state, controversies between citizens of different states, and controversies
between a state or the citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens, or
subjects.227 Thus, while federal jurisdiction over cases with foreign
elements was important to Hamilton, he did not believe that cases
involving the law of nations arose under the laws of the United States (if
we assume that The Federalist, Number 80, represents his views). This
point is noteworthy for two reasons. First, while Jay may have believed
that cases involving the law of nations arise under the laws of the United
States, Hamilton's views were different and hence demonstrate the
founding generation's lack of consensus on the question. Second, courts
223. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 475 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
224. Id. at 476-77.
225. Id. at 479-8 1.
226. Id. at 479-80.
227. Id. at 480-81.
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citing The Federalist, Number 80, to demonstrate Hamilton's support for
treating the law of nations as federal law, as was done by at least one
federal court of appeals, have read that paper quite incorrectly.22
For all of these reasons, Filartiga stands on shaky ground. The
case law cited in Filartiga simply fails to support the proposition that
customary international law arises under the laws of the United States,
and the Framers had no unified view on the question. In short, the
authorities Filartiga cites do not support its result.
B. Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: Contrary
Authority
The foregoing discussion demonstrates the scarcity of support for
Filartiga's argument that customary international law is federal common
law. The cases discussed in Section III.B, though inconsistent with that
argument, do not explicitly address the connection between the two
bodies of law. This Section examines cases that do address the
connection between customary international law and federal common law
and affirmatively hold that customary international law is not federal
law.
1. Pre-Erie Cases
A number of cases decided before Erie cast doubt on the ruling in
Filartiga. Under the logic of American Insurance Co. v. Canter,
customary international law cases do not arise under the laws of the
United States. This result follows because, in 1789, both admiralty cases
and cases involving treaties were understood to involve the law of
nations. Article III makes separate grants ofjurisdiction for those classes
of cases, on the one hand, and cases arising under the laws of the United
States, on the other. Following Marshall's reasoning in Canter, these
separate grants of jurisdiction imply that the laws of the United States
do not include the law of nations. If they did, separate grants of
jurisdiction regarding treaties and admiralty would have been
unnecessary because jurisdiction in such cases would have fallen within
the law of nations component of the laws of the United States. By
including separate jurisdictional grants, the language of Article III
renders the two types of cases mutually exclusive: jurisdiction to hear
the classes of cases based on the law of nations exists completely apart
from jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law. By extension,
then, "arising under" jurisdiction does not include cases involving
customary international law, a subset of the law of nations.
Several Supreme Court cases in addition to Canter address the
relationship between customary international law and the laws of the
228. See Estate of Marcos, 978 F.2d at 502.
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United States in the course of defining the Court's appellate jurisdiction.
Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789"2 authorized the Supreme
Court to review decisions from the states' highest courts where a state
statute or an exercise of state authority was allegedly "repugnant to the
constitution, treaties or laws of the United States."" 0 Jurisdiction
under § 25 hinged upon whether state courts had decided cases involving
the law of the United States.
The Supreme Court's application of § 25 in cases involving
questions of international law is instructive. In New York Life Insurance
Co. v. Hendren,"2 the Supreme Court found that it had no jurisdiction
to decide the Civil War's effect on a life insurance contract issued by a
New York firm upon the life of a Virginia citizen. In doing so, the
Court noted that the case did not present federal questions, but rather
involved only general law. 2 Because neither party argued "that the
general laws of war, as recognized by the law of nations applicable to
this case, were in any respect modified or suspended by the constitution,
laws, treaties, or executive proclamations, of the United States," federal
law was not in issue, and the Court lacked jurisdiction. 3 Thus, in the
majority's view, "the general laws of war, as recognized by the law of
nations" are not among the "laws . . .of the United States.
"234
The Court took a similar view in City and County of San Francisco
v. Scott." It found in Scott that it lacked jurisdiction to review a
California Supreme Court decision regarding the power of the alcalde
of San Francisco to grant pueblo lands after the American conquest of
California, but before California had adopted a state constitution. 2
The Court reasoned:
This does not depend on any legislation of Congress, or on the terms of the
treaty, but on the effect of the conquest upon the powers of local government in
the pueblo under the Mexican laws. That is a question of general public law, as
to which the decisions of the State Court are not reviewable here. 7
The Supreme Court's decision in Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist
Federated Soviet Republic2s also reinforces the conclusion that
229. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257).
230. Id. at 85.
231. 92 U.S. 286 (1875).
232. Id. at 286-87.
233. Id.
234. Justice Bradley, the lone dissenter, vehemently objected to this view, contending that
international law is the law of the United States. Id. at 287-88 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
235. 111 U.S. 768 (1884).
236. Id. at 769.
237. Id. Case law of the time makes clear that the "general law" referred to here is actually
the law of nations. See More v. Steinbach, 127 U.S. 70, 81 (1888); see also Mitchel v. United
States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 748-49 (1835) ("[A]ccording to the law of nations, the laws of a
conquered or ceded country remain in force till altered by the new sovereign.").
238. 266 U.S. 580 (1924).
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customary international law cases do not arise under the laws of the
United States. In Wulfsohn, the New York Court of Appeals held that
the government of the Soviet republic of Russia was entitled to sovereign
immunity, despite the U.S. government's refusal to recognize it, because
the actual sovereignty of the government was undisputed. 9 Although
the case presented a question of international law, the Supreme Court
dismissed the appeal "for the want of jurisdiction."240 In reaching this
result, the Court cited § 237 of the Judicial Code,24 which carried
forward § 25's limits on appellate jurisdiction. The Court also relied on
Oliver American Trading Co., Inc. v. Mexico.242 Oliver American
Trading turned on whether sovereign immunity involved some peculiarly
federal aspect of the courts' jurisdiction.243 The Supreme Court
concluded that review of the decision under § 238 was not available,
holding that it had jurisdiction under that section only where
there is in controversy the power of the court, as defined or limited by the
Constitution or statutes of the United States, to hear and determine the cause. It
is not presented where the question of jurisdiction to be decided turns upon
matters of general law applicable alike to actions brought in other tribunals. The
question of sovereign immunity is such a question of general law applicable as




The Court adhered to this position in Transportes Maritimos do Estado
v. Almeida2 45  by again refusing to review a district court's
jurisdictional determination because the case turned on a question of
foreign sovereign immunity, which, the Court held, did not present a
question of federal jurisdiction.246
Thus, the Supreme Court held on five occasions over a period of
nearly fifty years that questions of international law are not federal
questions.247 Filartiga and its progeny do not explain why they
239. Wolfson v. Russian Federated Soviet Republic, 138 N.E. 24, 25-26 (N.Y. 1923).
240. 266 U.S. at 580.
241. Act of Sept. 6, 1916, ch. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726, 726-27, repealed by Act of Jan. 31,
1928, ch. 14, § 1, 45 Stat. 54, 54.
242. 264 U.S. 440 (1924).
243. The reference in Wulfsohn to OliverAmerican Trading links the § 25 cases dealing with
customary international law to cases decided under § 238 of the Judicial Code and dealing with the
same subject. Section 238 permitted district courts' decisions regarding their own jurisdiction to
be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 305, 42 Stat. 837, 837, repealed
by Act of Jan. 31, 1928, ch. 14, § 1, 45 Stat. at 54. It had been interpreted as applying only in
cases in which some peculiarly federal issue was in question. OliverAmerican Trading was a case
in which the district court had dismissed a suit against Mexico on sovereign immunity grounds.
244. Id. at 442-43 (citations omitted).
245. 265 U.S. 104 (1924).
246. Id. at 105. Like Oliver American Trading, Ahneida turned on the validity of certificates
for Supreme Court review of a lower court's jurisdictional determination under § 238 of the
Judicial Code. See supra note 243.
247. Some of these cases were probably wrongly decided on their facts. See infra note 337.
Those involving sovereign immunity, addressing as they do the formal relations between the United
States and another government in that other government's capacity as a sovereign entity, would
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disregard these earlier holdings. Surely, however, decisions of lower
federal courts that depart from earlier Supreme Court holdings should
be accorded little weight as authority.
2. The Effect of Erie and Subsequent Cases
It might be argued that the Court's rejection of the concept of
general law in Erie renders the cases in the preceding section obsolete.
This argument brings to mind two responses. First, these cases, like
Erie, narrow federal courts' jurisdiction. To be sure, Erie provided the
impetus for the development of the modern concept of federal common
law. Generally, however, federal common law has not led to federal
control of subjects beyond those under at least de facto federal control
since 1789, except in cases in which Congress has implicitly directed the
courts to act or the Constitution has required a particular outcome.24
In contrast, extending federal common law status to customary
international law would federalize a subject over which the Supreme
Court consistently disclaimed control even pre-Erie.
Second, the cases discussed above are entirely consistent with
Erie's positivistic thrust. Those cases hold, as does Canter, that
customary international law is not the "law of the United States"
because the United States did not create it. This emphasis on the source
of the authority from which customary international law flows is in
perfect accord with Erie's central teaching.
Moreover, Supreme Court authority subsequent to Erie has not
displaced the five cases discussed above. Indeed, most relatively recent
cases dealing with these subjects continue to support the view that
customary international law is not part of the laws of the United States.
Romero v. International Operating Co. 249 most strongly supports this
position. In that case, the Supreme Court relied on Canter's holding that
Article I's grant of jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases is
seem to require a federal rule of decision at least as much as Sabbatino did. The Court apparently
decided, however, that those cases involved nothing more than the sovereign immunity standards
of customary international law. From the latter point of view, the decisions make sense. In other
words, the Court was correct to the extent it was saying that a case presenting a customary
international law issue does not necessarily present an issue of federal law. Where it erred was in
treating these cases as presenting only customary law issues; they also presented issues of
federalism, which the court failed to consider.
248. Thus, for example, the Court has filled gaps in federal statutes; implemented
constitutional protections for which Congress has failed to provide by statute, see, e.g., Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971); and
labelled as federal common law subjects effectively controlled by the Supreme Court prior to Erie
by applying general law principles to cases brought before the Court on jurisdictional bases other
than "arising under" jurisdiction. Compare Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (applying
general law principles to resolve interstate river dispute) with Hinderlider v. La Plata River Co.,
304 U.S. 92 (1938) (recharacterizing general law issue of Kansas as federal common law issue).
For a fuller discussion, see Weisburd, supra note 176, at 1242-49.
249. 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
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distinct from its grant of jurisdiction over cases arising under the laws
of the United States" 0 to reject the plaintiff's claim that his suit under
general maritime law arose under the laws of the United States."~ The
Court also argued that treating admiralty and maritime cases as arising
under the laws of the United States would permit parties to remove them
to federal court even absent diversity. 2 This interference with state
participation in the development of admiralty law would have
contradicted the longstanding authority of the states in this field 3 as
well as the tradition of interpreting federal jurisdiction narrowly so as
to avoid interference with state jurisdiction. 4 Though he wrote
separately, Justice Brennan agreed with the basic proposition in Canter
that the separate jurisdictional grants of Article III should not be read as
overlapping: "[a] matter affecting an ambassador or a consul is not per
se an action 'arising under,' just as it is not per se a maritime
action. "'
Neither the majority's opinion in Romero nor that of Justice
Brennan supports the claim that customary international law cases arise
under federal law. The majority held that admiralty cases do not arise
under the laws of the United States. Given the traditional connection
between admiralty law and what is now called customary international
law, this holding suggests that cases involving customary international
law are similarly outside U.S. law. Brennan's separate opinion on this
issue notes that the rules applied by American admiralty courts are in
fact created either by Congress or the courts - a characteristic not
shared by customary international law. Even Filartiga acknowledged that
this body of law is created by acts of independent countries, individually
or collectively, and not by American institutions.
Both the majority and Brennan accept Canter's argument
concerning the distinct character of the different jurisdictional grants in
Article I. This point affects not only admiralty cases, but also
customary international law. As pointed out above, 6 Canter's
approach leads to the conclusion that customary international law is not
part of the law of the United States. Brennan, to be sure, differs with
the majority by asserting that a given case may satisfy the criteria of
more than one heading of jurisdiction. But the argument for the federal
law status of customary international law depends on the assertion that
Article 's grants of jurisdiction are not distinct. 7 To use Justice
Brennan's phrasing, the claim that customary international law is the law
250. See supra text accompanying notes 186-193.
251. 358 U.S. at 361-65.
252. Id. at 371-72, 376-77.
253. Id. at 373-75.
254. Id. at 379-80.
255. Id. at 403 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
256. See supra text accompanying notes 186-193.
257. See Canter, 26 U.S. at 545-46.
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of the United States depends on the claim that admiralty cases are per
se cases arising under the law of the United States."
Finally, Justice Brennan took exception to the majority's opinion
because he disagreed with its assumption that the states played a
significant role in the fashioning of maritime law. There can be no
dispute, however, that the conclusion that customary international law
is federal law would affect a vast range of subjects that are central
concerns of state law. Therefore, both of the significant opinions in
Romero cut against the argument that customary international law is
federal law.
While Romero is the only relatively recent Supreme Court
authority bearing directly on the federalizing approach, Stanford v.
Kentucky and United States v. Alvarez-Machain both have some
relevance." 9 In Stanford, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment
did not forbid the execution of persons for crimes committed when they
were as young as sixteen; 20 it also expressly rejected the relevance of
other countries' practices with respect to the execution of juveniles261
despite arguments from amici that such executions violated customary
international law. 262 In Alvarez-Machain, the Court decided that rules
of customary international law regarding international abductions were
irrelevant to its determination whether U.S. law enforcement agents
violated the United States-Mexico extradition treaty by abducting a
Mexican doctor from Mexico.263 To be sure, neither of these cases
squarely addressed whether customary international law binds the federal
courts. The Court treated Stanford as an Eighth Amendment case,26"
and the kidnapped Mexican in Alvarez-Machafn never claimed that
customary international law considered apart from the extradition treaty
forbade the United States to try him. 265 Both cases, however, suggest
the Supreme Court's unwillingness to read customary international law
limitations into American law.
Indeed, if one looks for modern authority supporting the position
that customary international law is the law of the United States, the best
one can find is dictum from Sabbatino.266 The holding in Sabbatino,
however, was that the act of state doctrine - a rule of domestic law -
was a matter of federal law, not that customary international law was
258. See supra text accompanying note 255.
259. See supra note 85.
260. 492 U.S. at 380.
261. Id. at 369 n.1.
262. See Brief of Amicus Curim International Human Rights Law Group at 33-42, Wilkins
v. Missouri, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (No. 87-6026); Brief of Amicus Curie Defense for Children
International-USA at 14-63, Wilkins (No. 87-6026). Wilkins and Stanford were consolidated before
the U.S. Supreme Court.
263. 112 S. Ct. at 2195-96, 2196 n.15.
264. 492 U.S. at 364-65.
265. 112 S. Ct. at 2195.
266. See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
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federal law.267  Far from confirming the status of customary
international law as federal law, the Court in Sabbatino refused to apply
customary international law although it was arguably relevant.268
The foregoing discussion demonstrates the weakness of the
jurisdictional basis for asserting that customary international law is
federal common law. Reliance on admiralty cases such as The Nereide
and The Paquete Habana to support that assertion is fundamentally
flawed. The courts in those cases did not address whether cases
involving customary international law arise under the laws of the United
States. They did not need to, for the admiralty character of these
"supporting" cases gave them jurisdiction to apply international law
without having to first classify it. Moreover, courts have almost
certainly misconstrued the language they cite from those cases as
supporting the equation of international law with federal law. In
addition, Filartiga fails to address Hendren, Scott, Wulfsohn, Oliver
American Trading, and Almeida, cases squarely holding that
international law is not federal law. Romero, the only modern case to
address this issue, directly refutes the idea that federal law includes
customary international law. Stanford and Alvarez-Machaln similarly
give little weight to customary international law in cases in which,
arguably, it would have been relevant. Even Sabbatino, which appears
to support Filartiga, does so only through dictum. In short, a careful
reading of the relevant authorities demonstrates that customary
international law is not federal law within the meaning of Article III.
C. Customary International Law as Federal Common Law and the
Separation of Powers
Because the scope of customary international law is so broad,
literal application of the idea that customary international law is federal
common law would violate the principle of separation of powers.
267. Sabbatino, 377 U.S. at 425-28.
268. It might be argued that First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior de
Cuba also supports the argument that international law is federal law because it cites The Paquete
Habana for the proposition that "international law... 'is part of our law.'" Comnercio Exterior
de Cuba, 462 U.S. at 623 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700). The issue in that case,
however, was whether a corporation owned by the Cuban government should be seen as the alter
ego of that government with respect to a claim against Cuba. Federal jurisdiction was based on the
FSIA, and the Court referred to international law only in relation to the question of whether the
corporation could be identified with the government. Id. at 613-23. The case therefore does not
address the point at issue in the text. Indeed, its language seems if anything inconsistent with the
idea that international law is part of federal common law. Specifically, the Court held that "the
principles governing this case are common to both international law and federal common law,
which in these circumstances is necessarily informed both by international law principles and by
articulated congressional policies." Id. at 623. This language implies that the Court saw
international law and federal common law as distinct. An assertion that federal common law is "in
these circumstances... informed... by international law principles," id. at 623, is hard to
reconcile with the proposition that international law is federal common law.
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According to the Restatement of Foreign Relations: "'International
law' . . . consists of rules and principles of general application dealing
with the conduct of states and of international organizations and with
their relations inter se, as well as with some of their relations with
persons, whether natural or juridical."269 Thus, to say that
international law is federal law is to include in the federal law whatever
"rules and principles" customary international law imposes on "the
conduct of states .. and . . . their relations inter se,"
The list of such "rules and principles" is a long one. It includes
criteria for determining when an entity is a "state" as that term is used
in international law.27 It arguably includes limits on the right of
governments to expropriate the property of foreign nationals. 27'
Customary international law clearly forbids states to breach their treaties
with one another and determines when treaties may be deemed to have
been terminated and when they may be suspended.272 In addition, it
provides rules for identifying the sovereign of a particular territory and
for determining territorial boundaries. 7 According to the International
Court of Justice, customary international law also strictly limits the
authority of governments to use force against one another.274
While international law provides rules to govern these situations,
the federal courts have declined to review executive determinations
regarding each of these subjects and have generally characterized such
issues as confided by the Constitution to the political branches of the
federal government. Thus, for example, the courts have left it to the
Executive to decide whether the United States will recognize a particular
entity as a state.27 Relying on a long history of executive practice and
congressional acquiescence, the courts have also concluded that authority
to settle American citizens' claims regarding the expropriation of their
property by foreign states rests with the President.276
Cases dealing with treaty questions reinforce this conclusion, as the
courts are unwilling to enforce customary international law rules
regarding treaty implementation and termination against the federal
Executive. In Goldwater v. Carter,27' the Supreme Court refused to
act in response to a claim that the President's treaty termination was
contrary to the treaty's terms.278 Four justices were of the opinion that
269. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 3, § 101.
270. See BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 72-79.
271. See id. at 531-45.
272. See id. at 604, 616-22.
273. See id. at 127-71.
274. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 147 (June 27).
275. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
276. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679-84, 688 (1981).
277. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
278. See id. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
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all questions of treaty termination were unreviewable political
questions,2 79 while one took the position that the particular termination
at issue was a necessary incident of the President's recognition of a
government and was thus unreviewable as a matter of substantive law
because of its link to recognition. In sum, a majority of the Supreme
Court took the position that at least some treaty terminations by the
Executive could not be reversed by the judiciary281 despite the
customary international law requirement that treaties must be
observed28 - a federal law requirement if customary international law
is federal common law. The courts have held other questions regarding
the status of treaties to be purely matters for the Executive, 283 despite
the fact that, as noted above, customary international law regulates such
matters.
Executive determinations regarding U.S. claims to disputed
territory2 4 and competing territorial claims by foreign governments
are similarly binding on the judiciary.2 5 Finally, the courts have held
unreviewable executive decisions to use force in circumstances having
foreign relations effects.286 Indeed, even Sabbatino supported this
limited view of judicial authority; it refused to apply customary
international law because doing so might have interfered with the
workings of the Executive.287
The suggestion that customary international law is federal law thus
involves a serious paradox. On the one hand, international law purports
to regulate the behavior of governments. If it is also federal law, it
imposes limits on the U.S. government commensurate with restrictions
embodied in federal statutes. The federal courts nevertheless have
declared themselves .powerless to enforce these restrictions against the
federal government; indeed, they have, in a number of cases, held
279. Id. at 1002-06 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment).
280. Id. at 1006-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
281. Applying Dames & Moore's rule that the President obtains authority over aspects of
foreign affairs by virtue ofa longstanding executive practice in which the Congress has acquiesced,
it would appear in any case that the President has authority to terminate treaties without action by
either the Senate or the whole Congress. This result follows from the long history of unilateral
presidential treaty terminations. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., 95TH CONG.,
IST Sass., THE ROLE OF THE SENATE IN TREATY RATIFICATION 74-76 (Comm. Print 1977) (listing
instances of unilateral presidential treaty terminations).
282. See BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 616.
283. The Court has held itself bound by executive determinations that treaties were still in
force. See, e.g., Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1947); Factor v. Lauenheimer, 290 U.S.
276, 295, 298 (1933); Terlinden v. Ames, 182 U.S. 270, 282-88 (1902).
284. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 221 (1890).
285. Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839).
286. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 788-89 (1950); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2
Black) 635, 665-71 (1863); Simmons v. United States, 406 F.2d 456, 460 (5th Cir. 1969), cert,
denied, 395 U.S. 982 (1969); Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664, 665-66 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967); United States v. Hogans, 369 F.2d 359, 360 (2d Cir. 1966).
287. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427-33. Professor Burbank has made the same observation. See
Stephen B. Burbank, Federal Judgments Law. Sources ofAuthority and Sources of Rules, 70 TEX.
L. REv. 1551, 1577 (1992).
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themselves bound by executive determinations without regard to their
international legal merits.288 If this judicial deference stems from the
separation of powers principle, does it mean anything to say that
international law is part of American law? If federal courts will not
enforce this body of law against the federal government, to whom shall
it apply? The only other bodies to which international law could apply
would be foreign governments, but American courts cannot enforce that
law against them.2"9 In sum, if customary international law binds
governments, but American courts are powerless to enforce it against the
U.S. government, international law cannot really be federal law.
A number of writers have taken positions inconsistent with this
argument2 90 but have not fully considered the implications of the scope
of executive authority established by the decisions just described. A
critical element of the Erie holding was the emphasis on the
constitutional limits to the authority of the federal courts.2 91 That case
held that federal courts lacked authority to apply "general" law because
the Constitution did not vest power to create such law in the federal
courts. That the lower courts purported merely to be "discovering" law
was, therefore, irrelevant. To make a legal rule is to wield power, and
because the Constitution had not granted authority to exercise that power
to the federal courts, their assumption of it was unconstitutional.
After Erie, rules of nonstatutory law are law only because judges
say they are. If judges have no authority to speak, however, they cannot
circumvent their lack of authority by claiming, like ventriloquists'
dummies, to be passive conveyors rather than creators (as far as the
federal system is concerned) of the legal rules they apply. However,
constitutional authority for judicial involvement comes into question not
only when courts disregard state common law, but also whenever courts
intrude upon the powers of the other branches of the federal
government. Even if the courts base their intrusions on some body of
law, that body of law justifies court action only if the court has some
colorable claim to authority in the matter. Yet if the matter falls within
the exclusive control of another branch of the federal government, the
courts have no such authority. For them to seek to control the matter in
this situation is as much an abuse of judicial power as the lawmaking
that Erie repudiated. Longstanding judicial construction of the reach of
executive authority in the area of international relations establishes that
an attempt by the federal courts to control foreign policy determinations
288. E.g., Sinmnons, 406 F.2d at 460.
289. They have not claimed to do so since The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116,
137, 143, 146-47 (1812).
290. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, Can the President Do No Wrong?, 80 AM. J. INT'L L.
923 (1986); Michael J. Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary
International Law by the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 321 (1985); Jordan J.
Paust, The President Is Bound by international Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 377 (1987).
291. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
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in order to enforce international law is such a judicial usurpation. It
would be no less a usurpation if the courts claimed "merely" to be
"applying" customary international law.
Thus, if customary international law is federal law, it is a peculiar
sort of law - often not judicially enforceable against the only entity to
which it applies, subject to the control of the American courts, and
bound by the rules of customary international law. Of course, there is
a way out of this paradox: deny that customary international law is
federal law. The courts' unwillingness to apply customary international
law as a limit on the federal government makes sense if customary law
is not federal law and thus provides no authority for imposing limits.
Those rejecting this solution must show how federal law can be
understood as including a body of rules that the Constitution forbids the
federal courts to enforce.
VI. RESOLVING JUDGE JESSUP'S DILEMMA
The preceding Part argues that customary international law is not
federal common law. However, at first glance this view does not address
a serious problem noted by Judge Philip Jessup, a former U.S. judge on
the International Court of Justice. Jessup observed that Erie asserts that
state law governs cases in federal courts "[e]xcept in matters governed
by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress."292 He pointed out
that, if this assertion were true, then state law would determine when
and how to apply customary international law. Not only would the
Supreme Court be unable to establish authoritatively rules of
international law for American courts, but it, and all federal courts,
would also have to apply the state courts' views of international law.
This state of affairs, warned Jessup, would be unwise. 293
It would be strange indeed if the Supreme Court were obliged to
decide a question of customary international law by applying the version
of customary international law enunciated by a state court - particularly
if state courts differed over what counted as a norm of customary
international law. The oddity of this situation may explain why some
commentators and courts have concluded that customary international
law must be federal law. Nevertheless, as pointed out in Parts II.B and
IV.B, that position cannot be regarded as the current law because it is
inconsistent with numerous decisions.294 Judge Jessup's argument thus
presents a dilemma. How can one reconcile Erie with the demands of a
national approach to international law without treating customary
international law as federal common law?
The resolution of Judge Jessup's dilemma is to treat customary
292. Jessup, supra note 28, at 740 (quoting Erie, 304 U.S. at 78).
293. Id. at 742-43.
294. See supra parts III.B and IV.B.
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international law as neither state nor federal law, but rather as
international law, that is, law made, not by American states or the
federal government, but collectively by the world's nations and available
to American courts in appropriate cases. This approach to customary
international law is not a return to the pre-positivistic conception of law
as a "discoverable" body of doctrine that somehow binds human activity
without reference to human agency; nor is it an effort to resurrect the
concept of general law as enunciated in Swift v. Tyson.295 Instead, this
position treats customary international law as analogous to the law of a
foreign country. In the same way that courts will, when required by
relevant conflicts rules, apply the law of some foreign nation, so they
would apply international law in proper cases. Of course, international
law is not the law of a foreign sovereign. It is the product of joint
lawmaking activities of many sovereigns. This distinction would not,
however, be a barrier to its application.
This approach provides a number of advantages. Most importantly,
it reflects the reality of customary international law-making. Neither the
states, the federal courts, nor the U.S. Congress, create customary
international law; it is the product of the practices of many countries,
with the United States as a leading actor. Given this fact, it seems
undesirable to employ a conceptual framework that labels international
law as federal common law when the U.S. government obviously does
not create it.
A second advantage to this approach to customary international law
is that it corresponds, by and large, to the way that law is treated in the
courts. Federal courts do not treat customary international law like state
law, but neither do they treat it as the equivalent of federal statutory law
binding the Executive. Nor have federal or state courts treated
customary international law as federal common law prevailing over state
statutes. Indeed, the current uses of customary international law treat it
as available to American courts but distinct from American law - a
position corresponding to the suggestion that international law be
analogized to the law of a foreign country.
This approach yields results different from those that flow from
treating customary international law as federal common law. Consider,
for example, a criminal defendant facing the death penalty in a state
court for a crime committed at age seventeen. The defendant
acknowledges that the Constitution does not forbid capital punishment
in such circumstances296 but argues that customary international law
does. If the court takes a conflicts of law approach to customary
international law, it will ignore the defendant's argument because it is
not obliged to apply another lawmaking entity's rules to a matter with
295. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
296. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
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which it has an adequate connection.297 The court will apply its own
law because the crime occurred within its borders. If customary
international law is federal common law, however, it will supersede
state law. The court in the hypothetical would consequently have to
determine and apply the rule of customary international law regarding
infliction of the death penalty on juveniles. Thus, by treating customary
international law as federal common law, the court could find itself
forced not to apply its own law.29
To treat customary international law in the same manner as the law
of a foreign state, the courts must abandon the notion that customary
international law is the law of the United States within the meaning of
Article III and that claims based on customary international law
therefore arise under federal law. The number of cases affected need not
be large, however, and the imposition of a coherent analytical
framework on this area of the law outweighs any disadvantages resulting
from a slight narrowing of federal jurisdiction.
This approach nevertheless must face a number of additional
objections. The first is that Erie literally requires treating all cases not
involving federal law as state law. The response to this argument is that
Erie did not involve customary international law. The difficulties of
treating customary international law as either federal or state law are
different from the issues before the Court in Erie; broad dicta from that
case ought not control the different problem that customary international
law presents.
A more sophisticated version of this objection is that, because Erie
destroys the notion of a general law existing independently of a
sovereign authority, everything that was formerly regarded as general
law is, post-Erie, state law. In other words, because customary
international law was conceived as part of the general law before Erie,
customary international law is also state law.
This objection misreads Erie. In rejecting the concept of general
law, Erie requires a court to identify the human agency authorized to
make law on a particular subject. Yet, Erie surely does not stand for the
proposition that American states are the only actors to whom we can
look to find expressions of positive law that replace general law.
297. This argument is based on an analogy to Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 412-13
(1955), a workers' compensation case, in which the Court held that a forum state can ignore the
law of another state and apply its own law on the same subject if the forum state has an adequate
basis for applying its law.
298. There is authority for the proposition that customary international law forbids the
imposition of capital punishment for crimes committed prior to the actor's eighteenth birthday. The
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has stated that, while no customary international
norm now prohibits execution of juveniles, such a norm is "emerging." Case 9647, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. 147, 170-72, OEA/Ser.L/VII, doc. 17 rev. 3 (1987); see also Dinah Shelton, Note, 8
HUM. RTs. L.J. 355 (1987) (arguing that there is norm of customary international law establishing
eighteen as age of majority for permissible infliction of capital punishment).
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For example, in Hinderlider v. La Plata River Co. ,299 decided on
the same day as Erie, the Court applied what it called a federal common
law rule regarding interstate rivers. Hinderlider derived the rule it
applied from earlier cases decided on the basis of general law rules.
3°°
Thus, just as Erie recharacterized a general law issue as a state law
matter, so also Hinderlider recharacterized a general law issue as a
matter of federal common law. Each case, that is, insisted on identifying
a human lawmaker as the source of a rule instead of ascribing that rule
to general law. The human agency in Hinderlider, however, was the
federal judiciary, not the states. Read with Hinderlider, then, Erie can
hardly mean that only the states can make law on subjects that were
previously general law matters.
Accordingly, the best way to read Erie is not as woodenly equating
general law with state law, but as rejecting general law and insisting that
any rule must be attributed to some particular lawmaking authority. This
interpretation fits the approach to customary international law suggested
in this Part because the human authority that creates customary
international law is the collective international community. That
community makes law by employing mechanisms as positivistic as those
the states employ. Thus, applying rules developed under the authority of
the international community hardly amounts to resurrecting the concept
of general law. Rather, such an approach incorporates the insight from
Erie, that human agency creates law, and looks to the appropriate
agency to determine a particular law's content.
A second objection to treating customary international law as
analogous to foreign law is that, while the federal government does not
create customary international law, not all elements of federal common
law need be federally created. On the contrary, the Supreme Court has
occasionally held that even though federal law governs a particular
matter, state law should be incorporated as federal law if the law of the
state is consistent with federal policy.3"' Could not customary
299. 304 U.S. at 92.
300. Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 110. The Hinderlider court relied on Kansas v. Colorado in
applying the federal common law rule. In Kansas the Court had applied principles of the "common
law generally in force throughout the United States" to resolve a dispute between two states over
a river. 206 U.S. at 96-98 (quoting Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publishing Co., 181 U.S. 92,
101 (1901)). The Kansas court, however, was referring not to a federal common law, but to the
general law that Erie later rejected. See id.
301. For example, in Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991), the
Court ruled that federal law must necessarily govern the question whether persons bringing suit
under the Investment Company Act of 1940 against investment companies in which they owned
shares must demand relief from the boards of directors of those companies. Id. at 97. It also held
that the federal courts would adopt as federal law the different states' rules for making such
demands absent evidence that a state rule would be inconsistent with the policies embodied in the
Act. Id. at 108. Similarly, United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979) held that
the source of law governing the priority of liens stemming from federal lending programs is
federal, but that the Court would incorporate state standards into federal law state standards
regarding lien priority. Id. at 718. The Court considered but rejected arguments that the
incorporation of state standards would interfere with federal interests. Id. at 726-40.
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international law be treated in the same way, acknowledging its
nonfederal source while still ensuring that its employment is a federal
question?
Responding to this point requires consideration of the significance
of labelling incorporated state law as "federal." What is the advantage
of inserting a "federal" label if state law is to govern? One suggested
answer is that such an analysis clarifies the federal courts' authority to
craft their own rule if state law does not adequately protect federal
interests, while it also saves the federal courts from duplicating state
efforts that are otherwise sufficient. 2
Under such an approach, treating customary international law as
incorporated federal common law is problematic. Filartiga does not
suggest that customary international law is federal common law in the
same sense that incorporated state law is federal common law. Rather,
in Filartiga customary international law is of its own force federal
common law, whether or not the federal courts are comfortable with the
results of applying customary international law. Furthermore, American
federal or state governments are not the primary creators of customary
international law; all countries contribute to its creation. "Incorporating"
that body of law as federal common law cannot change the fact that the
content of the law exists quite independently of the predilections of
American courts, in the same way that the law of France or Russia
exists quite apart from American judges' evaluations of those nations'
laws. In contrast, federal courts can control the content of state law
incorporated as federal law by refusing to employ state rules that neglect
federal interests. A federal court facing a case in which customary
international law applies cannot, however, reject the content of
customary international law as contrary to federal interests while
simultaneously asserting that it is applying that law - indeed, asserting
that it is required to apply that law - because customary international
law is federal common law. Thus, the analogy of customary
international law to incorporated state law is fatally flawed.
A final objection to the suggested solution to Judge Jessup's
dilemma arises from the limited authority of federal courts sitting in
diversity to create law. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing
Co.3"3 held that a federal diversity court must apply the conflicts of
law rules of the state in which the court sits. The Klaxon approach to
conflicts of law, therefore, seems to limit a federal diversity court to
applying customary international law only if it would be applied by the
courts of the state in which the federal court sits.
The Court's holding in Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines 4 further
complicates this problem. Professor Wright has suggested that Nolan
302. See LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITrEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 475 (2d ed. 1994).
303. 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941).
304. 365 U.S. 293 (1961).
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stands for the proposition that, if the forum state's choice of law rules
require reference to the law of some other state, a federal court may not
independently determine the content of the second state's law, but must
follow the forum state's view of that law.3"' Accordingly, a federal
court permitted to apply customary international law by the conflicts of
law rules of the state in which it sits would have to accept that state's
version of the content of international law. These readings of Klaxon and
Nolan do not avoid the result Judge Jessup feared, even if customary
international law is the equivalent of the law of a foreign sovereign. For
a federal court could apply customary international law only when the
state would do so (Klaxon), and only according to the state's version of
customary international law (Nolan).
Even this final objection fails, however. First, Wright reads Nolan
too broadly. Nolan was brought in New York federal district court; New
York conflicts of law principles clearly required the application of a
California statute.3"6 Although California's intermediate appellate
courts had previously interpreted that statute, the California Supreme
Court interpreted it differently (in dictum) in a decision handed down
shortly before the Nolan decision in the Second Circuit. The California
Supreme Court's interpretation did not come to the attention of the
federal appellate court.307 For this reason, the Supreme Court vacated
the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case to permit
consideration of the California Supreme Court's dictum.30 8
Specifically, the Supreme Court ordered the federal court of appeals to
determine whether the dictum from the California Supreme Court or the
older holdings by the intermediate state appellate courts would control
in New York courts."
Clearly, this case was not one in which a federal court was bound
by one state's construction of another state's law. Rather, the issue was
how the forum would go about determining the content of the reference
state's law. The Court made no suggestion that the forum courts could
employ some outlandish means of making that determination - for
example, by construing the California statute without considering
constructions of the statute given by California's own courts. At most,
then, this case holds that a federal court applying the forum's choice of
law rules because of Klaxon must also employ the forum's method for
determining the law of another state as long as the method is reasonable.
Nolan, then, hardly stands for the proposition that federal courts
must accept bizarre state interpretations of foreign law. Several other
Supreme Court decisions reinforce this narrow reading of Nolan. Both
305. WRIGHT, supra note 51, at 390.
306. Nolan, 365 U.S. at 294.
307. Id. at 295.
308. Id. at 295-96.
309. Id.
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Home Insurance Co. v. Dick310  and Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts hold that state courts violate due process of law when they
apply their own substantive law to suits involving transactions with
which the state has no significant connection." 2 Further, Sun Oil Co.
v. Wortman3t 3 suggests that a state court would deny a litigant due
process if it purported to apply the law of some other state but
misconstrued the law in a way contradicting a "clearly established" rule
that had come to the court's attention.31 4
Taken together, these cases necessarily limit Klaxon and Nolan. If
a state court denies due process by applying its own law to a matter,
then Klaxon can hardly stand for the proposition that a federal court
sitting in that state must apply forum law to the matter simply because
forum choice of law rules would require that result. Likewise, Nolan
cannot be read as requiring a federal court to employ the forum's
method of interpreting foreign law if that method would lead to
interpretations ignoring "clearly established" foreign rules. 1 5
These conclusions likewise apply to cases involving customary
international law. Suppose a federal court was hearing a diversity case,
and one of the parties raised a question of customary international law.
Klaxon would require the federal court to determine whether, under the
conflicts rules of the state in which the case was heard, a state court
would treat the matter as an international law question. However, if the
state lacked a significant connection to the matter but nonetheless
claimed authority to apply local law according to conflicts rules, Dick
and Shutts would require the federal court to disregard the state's
determination. Alternatively, suppose the state treated the matter as one
involving international law but had enunciated as the relevant rule of
international law a formulation much at odds with the general
understanding of the issue. Sun Oil would require the federal court to
310. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
311. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
312. Id. at 816-23; 281 U.S. at 407-08.
313. 486 U.S. 717 (1988).
314. Sun Oil determined that no such due process denial had occurred in the case before it
by analyzing for itself the rules allegedly misread by the forum. Id. at 731-34.
315. This argument has a certain intuitive appeal. Imagine a situation in which the courts of
State A are obliged to construe the tort law of State B. Supreme Court A concludes that B follows
a particular rule. In a subsequent case, the same issue of B law arises in the courts of A. The A
trial judge conducts a very thorough review of the law of B and concludes that Supreme Court A
simply misunderstood the law of B in the earlier case, and therefore applies a different rule as the
law of B, supporting her conclusions with careful citations to the law of B. Would Supreme Court
A overrule this determination, insisting that its decisions fix the law of B for purposes of the courts
of A? More plausibly, Supreme Court A would acknowledge its mistake and recognize that A's
courts are not expert, let alone authoritative, as to B's law. If this is true, however, the first
determination of B's law by Supreme Court A could never have established a legal rule in A
regarding B's law. If that conclusion is correct, then a federal court sitting in A would have no A
rule regarding B law to apply. Finally, if all of the foregoing makes sense with respect to a state's
reading of the law of another state, it would seem to make equal sense regarding a state's reading
of the law of a foreign country or of international law.
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disregard the state's version of the international rule and instead
determine the content of the correct rule itself. The Supreme Court's
willingness in Sun Oil to review state court decisions to determine
whether courts below had disregarded those decisions implies that the
Court considers itself obliged to compare a forum court's reading of
foreign law to its own understanding of the relevant foreign law when
it decides Sun Oil-type due process claims. While the Sun Oil majority
concluded that foreign law had not been disregarded in that case, its
analysis suggests that a federal diversity court may adopt an
understanding of foreign law - or customary international law -
different from that expressed by the courts of the state in which the
federal court presides.
Rejecting the argument that customary international law is federal
common law thus does not necessarily confine the U.S. Supreme Court
to a state court's reading of customary international law in diversity
cases. For if one assumes that customary international law is distinct
from both state and federal law, then the Constitution obliges federal
courts, even sitting in diversity, to ignore incorrect state readings of that
law and to determine the law's proper content for themselves.
This argument also suggests a basis for Supreme Court review of
state cases involving international law not considered in the nineteenth-
century decisions discussed in Part V. If a state refuses to apply
customary international law in a case in which that law clearly governs,
or applies a purported rule of customary international law that clearly
distorts the actual rule, the losing litigant can claim she was denied due
process of law by analogizing her case to the disregard or
misconstruction of another state's law as addressed in Shutts and Sun
Oil.
This approach preserves the federal courts' power to determine the
content of rules of international law, and also provides an argument for
Supreme Court review of state international law cases. At the same
time, it eliminates the objectionable features of the argument that
customary international law is federal common law. This approach does
not tie the hands of the President because it views customary
international law as comparable to the law of a foreign country, not as
federal law, which would be binding on the federal Executive. Nor does
it automatically displace state law; in cases where customary
international law arguably applies, states would still be free to apply
their own law if they have a substantial connection to the matter at bar.
International law, for example, would not displace state criminal law.
Admittedly, the objectionable features discussed in the foregoing
paragraph are currently only of hypothetical concern. Even while
applying the rule that customary international law is federal common
law, federal courts have not in fact relied on international law to restrain
the federal Executive or to preempt state law. Thus, the approach
suggested here would not alter present day judicial outcomes with
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respect to these subjects; it would, however, eliminate some analytical
confusion.
The practical difference between applying the suggested approach
and treating international law as federal common law relates to federal
court jurisdiction. Litigants would no longer be able to take suits into
federal court on the ground that they implicate customary international
law.
This concern is not sufficiently serious to justify rejecting the
approach put forward by this Section. The relatively small number of
litigants adversely affected by this approach must be weighed against the
serious analytical problems, and possible practical objections, to treating
customary international law as federal common law. Moreover, to the
extent that the change in federal jurisdiction is a problem, remedies
abound. Most obviously, Congress can enact statutes creating federal
causes of action for violations of international law, as it has done with
respect to torture, for example. 1 6 Further, state courts could be used
where an alien sues another alien; under the above analysis, U.S.
Supreme Court review would be available if the state disregarded clearly
established rules of international law.
In short, the approach suggested in this Section preserves the
autonomy of the federal courts regarding customary international law
while avoiding an analytical method that risks judicial interference with
executive authority and/or wholesale displacement of state law. It is also
more solidly grounded in authority than the argument that customary
international law is federal common law. This approach is tlherefore the
best way to deal with the dilemma posed by Judge Jessup in 1939.
VII. THE LiMITS OF THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS
3 17
Determining the extent of the federal common law of foreign
relations requires a qualitatively different inquiry than that used to
determine the jurisdictional status of cases involving customary
international law, though the inquiries naturally overlap. As noted
above, the basic question regarding customary international law is
whether it can be considered federal common law at all. In contrast,
Sabbatino makes clear that some federal common law of foreign
relations exists; the problem is determining what it includes.
Although a number of writers have espoused general theories on
the circumstances in which federal courts may generate common law,
316. See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992)
(codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West Supp. 1994)).
317. For a somewhat different approach to the question of when federal law must displace
state actions affecting foreign relations, see Harold G. Maier, Preemption of State Law: A
Recommended Analysis, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 832 (1989).
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their views, to put it mildly, run the gamut.318 Writings on the federal
common law of foreign relations provide no exception.319 This
disagreement among commentators suggests that only a careful study of
the case law can define the limits of a federal common law of foreign
relations.
The federal common law of foreign relations is "pure" common
law - legal rules created by courts without reliance on either federal
statutes or the Constitution.32 The Supreme Court explored the limits
of this completely nonconstitutional, nonstatutory common law in Boyle
v. United Technologies Corp.32" ' In holding that contractors could rely
on federal common law to defend against certain state tort suits, 322 the
Boyle Court observed that
a few areas, involving "uniquely federal interests," are so committed by the
Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control that state law is pre-
empted and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed
(absent explicit statutory directive) by the courts - so-called "federal common
law..32
The Court went on to stress, however, that a uniquely federal interest
in a particular area by itself will not create federal common law.324
There must also be either a significant conflict "between an identifiable
federal policy or interest and the [operation] of state law," or a situation
where "the application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of
federal legislation."" In addition, the Court noted that where there is
a federal interest in a nationally uniform rule regarding an entire body
of law, federal law must displace the entire body of state law.326 In
other situations, only particular elements of state law would be preempted?27
318. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
HARv. L. REV. 881 (1986); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52
U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1985); Martin H. Redish, Federal Coimnon Law, Political Legitimacy, and
the Interpretive Process:An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 761 (1989); Louise
Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805 (1989).
319. Compare Burbank, supra note 287, at 1581-82 (arguing that case for application of
federal common law rules regarding recognition of foreign country judgments "crumbles to dust"
when issue arises in diversity case) with Donald T. Trautman, Toward Federalizing Choice of Law,
70 TEX. L. REV. 1715, 1735-36 (1992) (calling for federal common law rules regarding
recognition of foreign country judgments and suggesting that "[in time, all questions involving
other countries may come within the sway of federal common law").
320. Given this definition, the following discussion will not address cases holding that, for
purposes of applying the FSIA, the effect to be given the juridically separate status of a corporation
owned by a foreign government was a matter of federal common law. See, e.g., Comercio Exterior
de Cuba, 462 U.S. at 622 n.ll. Such cases are less relevant to the present inquiry because they
are closely linked to statutory interpretation.
321. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
322. Id. at 512-14.
323. Id. at 504 (citation omitted).
324. Id. at 507.
325. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
326. Id. at 508.
327. Id.
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Under the Boyle analysis, the reach of the federal common law of
foreign relations thus depends upon the scope of the "uniquely federal
interest" with respect to foreign relations. Yet in Sabbatino, federal law
displaced state law where the applicable state rule and the federal rule
were apparently identical.328 This result implies that courts need not
determine whether federal and state law conflict in individual foreign
relations cases because the uniformity requirement mandates the
displacement of an entire body of state law. The courts still must,
however, determine the scope of the federal interest. Perhaps
surprisingly, the cases suggest that federal common law standards
regarding foreign relations apply in only a limited area.
Some elements of this federal interest are easy to identify.
Obviously, the interest in uniformity extends to all aspects of this
country's political and military dealings with other countries. The federal
government's authority over immigration is likewise uncontroversial.
Sabbatino makes clear that American diplomats' need for maximum
flexibility in addressing seizures of American-owned property abroad
requires a uniform rule, and Zschernig indicates that at least some
statutes providing state judges with the opportunity to criticize foreign
governments interfere with the federal foreign relations power.
On the other hand, several Supreme Court cases and statutes place
limits on this federal interest. Day & Zimmerman rejects the argument
that federal law automatically governs any international aspect of a case.
DeCanas recognizes some state authority to take actions affecting aliens
despite exclusive federal control of immigration. Similarly, Kirkpatrick
holds that a case's potential for embarrassing a foreign government does
not require state courts to apply the federal act of state doctrine provided
that no actual invalidation of some foreign act is at issue. In Barclays
Bank the Court upheld a state taxing scheme despite its negative effect
on U.S. relations with a number of other countries. Moreover, the
federal foreign trade statutes discussed above329 evidence congressional
support for state government action to encourage foreign trade, a posture
hardly consistent with the idea that any state action involving dealings
abroad infringes upon federal prerogatives. The FSIA assumes that state
courts will hear cases involving foreign governments and provides for
application of state law to determine the liability of foreign governments
not immune from suit.330
Together, these cases define the federal interest giving rise to the
federal common law of foreign relations, and, by extension, limit that
common law. Few would dispute that the federal government must
control immigration policy and all military and diplomatic dealings with
foreign states. Thus, federal law governs questions regarding the formal
328. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 424-25.
329. See supra notes 165-168 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 169-172 and accompanying text.
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exercise of authority by foreign states (Sabbatino), and state officials
may not base formal decisions, such as court judgments, on general
evaluations of the public policies of foreign states (Zschernig). State
authority, however, is limited only by the requirement that it not directly
usurp federal prerogatives. Hence, states may regulate a population also
affected by federal immigration law as long as the regulation does not
conflict with federal policy (DeCanas). State courts are similarly free to
hear suits whose outcome could annoy foreign governments provided
they do not question the validity of those governments' actions
(Kirkpatrick). Moreover, the state may apply its own law in suits against
non-immune foreign governments (Comercio Exterior de Cuba). States
may persist in actions that negatively affect U.S. foreign relations, if the
actions are clearly within their jurisdiction and Congress acquiesces
(Barclays Bank). Finally, states may even conduct international trade
activities outside of the United States.
What then is the legal standard defining the limits of the federal
common law of foreign relations? Foreign relations common law seems
to encompass only immigration questions and American dealings with
foreign governments in their sovereign capacities. 3 ' This formulation
suggests that federal common law must displace state law in only three
types of cases. First, any matter that requires a prior decision about
what counts as a foreign state necessarily involves a federal interest, and
federal law must therefore control. This federal control is necessary
because permitting states to determine for themselves what entities
qualify as foreign states could undermine federal control of formal
international relations. Second, federal law should control in matters
where a foreign state's public policy will be subject to formal judicial
evaluation, as this evaluation impinges upon the federal interest in
controlling diplomatic contacts. Finally, federal law must control
immigration matters.
Cases falling outside these three categories, in contrast, fail to
implicate a federal interest, and federal law should not apply, regardless
of whether the result of the lawsuit could in some general way affect
relations between the United States and a foreign government. This
standard makes sense as a matter of principle. In a world of growing
interdependence, the activities of innumerable domestic institutions must
affect some aspect of foreign relations. Attempts to prevent such effects
are likely to be as successful as attempts to command the tide. Further,
federalism in the United States is intended to permit different American
states to take different approaches to similar problems; to be persuasive,
arguments in favor of the United States addressing those subjects with
one voice must explain why the advantages of unanimity outweigh the
331. The common law of foreign relations does not involve dealings with foreign states in
their capacities as commercial actors, in which cases they would be deprived of sovereign
immunity under the FSIA.
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system's basic assumption that local autonomy is generally desirable. To
be sure, all parties concerned must clearly understand which institution
within the United States has the last word in dealings with other
governments. The standard suggested above preserves federal
government control over foreign relations, particularly by the Executive,
by forbidding states from taking their own official positions regarding
formal acts of foreign governments, including positions based on
evaluations of the validity or desirability of foreign governments'
policies. This standard also forbids states from dealing directly with
foreign nationals in their capacities as aliens. It thus provides the federal
government with the authority required to deal with foreign governments
and to control access to the United States, while it also acknowledges the
impossibility of preventing all state government actions that in some way
touch on foreign relations.
Two other points should be noted about the proposed standard.
First, the statement that cases of the suggested types implicate federal
common law does not suggest that the federal courts will themselves
craft all the rules necessary to resolve such cases. Given the nature of
the cases, federal courts will probably create a choice of law rule to
ensure that (where foreign sovereign immunity does not bar the suit)
courts apply the body of law most appropriate for such cases. It would
rarely be appropriate for the federal courts to fashion substantive liability
rules. The importance of the interests involved, however, might well
require those courts to frame choice of law rules ensuring the application
of a rule created by either the Executive Branch, the law of a foreign
country, or customary international law.
The second point clarifies the last element of the first: in some
circumstances the federal common law of foreign relations will require
the application of customary international law. In such a case, the court
would have subject matter jurisdiction not because customary
international law was involved, but because the legal standard described
above was satisfied. Nonetheless, given the thrust of the arguments in
Parts V and VI, it is important to make clear that federal courts will
have jurisdiction in some cases only because federal common law is
involved, and that customary international law may provide the rule of
decision in these cases. It is equally important to stress, however, that
federal common law does not govern in such cases because customary
international law provides the rule of decision.
An illustration may help clarify these last two points. Imagine that
Plaintiff, the owner of a long-distance fishing vessel, brings suit to
collect on a policy insuring the vessel against "unlawful seizures."
Suppose the vessel's catch is seized by the Navy of Foreign Country
X, which is not a party to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, 490
miles from X's coast. To decide the case, the court must determine if the
act of state doctrine applies. If the court does not apply that doctrine, it
must necessarily determine whether the action of the X Navy was an
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"unlawful seizure." That is, it must formally evaluate the public policy
of a foreign state. According to the legal standard advocated in this Part,
this case would present an issue of federal common law. Customary
international law is the only source of legal rules by which to evaluate
that policy because the public policy in question involves actions on the
high seas not regulated by treaty. As explained above, the only federal
decision would be a determination to apply customary international law
to the case. Drawing on experience in determining rules created by other
nonfederal lawmaking authorities, the court would then determine the
content of that body of law. Again, federal jurisdiction exists in this
scenario not because it might involve customary international law, but
because it must involve the evaluation of a foreign sovereign's public
policy.
How do the cases discussed in Part IV fare when measured against
this standard for federal common law? The result in Republic of Iraq,
which required that federal law govern the enforceability of a foreign
decree purporting to confiscate property located within the United States,
seems sound. Republic ofIraq involved the evaluation of the legal effect
of a foreign sovereign's official act and as such should rest on federal
law. Under this standard, however, the other cases discussed in Section
III.A were wrongly decided.
This conclusion is most obvious with respect to Gilbertson, Tahan,
and Chick Kam Choo. The first two cases involved the enforcement of
foreign court judgments; the last addressed the question of whether
federal rules regarding forum non conveniens govern in state maritime
cases involving foreign countries. None of these cases raises issues
regarding U.S. dealings with foreign sovereigns or involves any
evaluation of foreign government policy. They would thus offer no basis
for displacing state law.
Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos is also questionable. The
court in that case gave several reasons for its conclusion that federal
common law governed: the Republic's claims required determinations
directly and significantly affecting the foreign relations of the United
States;332 the action was one by a foreign government against its
former head of state; the suit was intended to regain property obtained
by the defendant while he was head of state; and it involved a request
by a foreign government to freeze assets held within the United
States.333 The court did not rely on Marcos's official position as a
justification for entertaining the suit; on the contrary, it stressed the
private character of the acts of which Marcos was accused in explaining
the unavailability of the act of state defense.334
332. Republic of the Phil., 806 F.2d at 352. The court was considering whether it had
jurisdiction under the Constitution, federal law, or treaties. See id. at 352-53.
333. Id. at 354.
334. Id. at 357-60. To the extent that scrutiny of Marcos's public acts was in question, the
standard for federal common law would arguably be satisfied.
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At least some of the court's bases for its conclusions here are
clearly inconsistent with the proposed standard. That a legal matter
could affect U.S. relations with a foreign state, for example, does not
require courts to apply federal law. 35 Likewise, the fact that the case
pits a foreign state against its former ruler does not require application
of federal law. After all, if the positions were reversed and the deposed
ruler sued the foreign state, Comercio Exterior de Cuba makes clear
that, given FSIA permission to proceed at all, federal law would not
provide the substantive liability standards. Why would the state's posture
as the plaintiff rather than the defendant alter the law to be applied?
Finally, the Philippines' request for equitable relief did not somehow
implicate federal law. The Philippines did not argue that its decree had,
of its own force, a legal effect in the United States. On the contrary, the
Philippines based its prayer for an injunction on the usual rules required
for obtaining equitable relief in American courts. 36 If the issue had
simply been the effect appropriately given to some foreign government
action, then, under Republic ofIraq, a federal question would have been
presented. Here, however, the foreign government's position was no
different from that of a private victim of fraud, and it sought only the
relief normally available to such victims. In short, this case did not
implicate any interest that Congress or the Supreme Court has indicated
must be controlled by federal law and thus would not properly arise
under the federal common law of foreign relations. 37
The Sequihua holding also conflicts with the standard applied here.
The Sequihua plaintiffs did not seek any sort of legal evaluation of a
foreign government's acts. Moreover, the relief they sought did not
require the court to nullify any act by that government. To be sure,
Ecuador did not want the suit to proceed; however, a suit's potential to
annoy a foreign government or even to. complicate the international
relations of the United States is not sufficient to implicate the federal
common law of foreign relations under the standard set out in this
335. See supra notes 160-164 and accompanying text.
336. Republic of the Phil., 806 F.2d at 351-52.
337. The Republic of the Philippines litigation did include one federal element, however, the
issue of head of state immunity. Id. at 360. The FSIA arguably indicates a congressional
determination that federal law should govern international immunity questions. Further, since
judges must evaluate the official acts of foreign states in making immunity decisions, federal law
should control these issues even under the suggested standard for the federal common law of
foreign relations. Thus, if Ferdinand Marcos had raised an immunity claim, federal law would
govern. However, on the facts of the case, this federal element is irrelevant because it would be
raised as part of a defense. Jurisdiction in Republic of the Philippines was based on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, not on the FSIA. See id. at 352. Under § 1331, the federal basis for the claim had to
appear on the face of the complaint, not in the defendant's pleadings. Id.
The notion that international immunity cases involve the federal common law of foreign
relations suggests that Wulfsohn was wrongly decided. Wulfsohn held that sovereign immunity
raises no federal questions and thus provided no basis for Supreme Court review of a state
decision. Wuifsohn, 266 U.S. at 580. The error in Wulfsohn was more its failure to see the federal
element in the facts before it, rather than its failure to see international cases as raising federal
questions generally.
1995] State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases 63
118Section.~
Most of the lower court decisions discussed in Section IV.B satisfy
the legal standard suggested here. Solitron, Granger, Choo, and Trojan
Technologies involve neither immigration questions nor formal
challenges to the actions of foreign governments. Chuidian and Republic
of Iran both were decided on procedural grounds that involved none of
the considerations informing the federal common law of foreign relations
as defined in this Part. Zeevi and Baltimore City, however, would
require the application of federal law under the standard set out herein
and thus claim too much for the states. Zeevi raises the same concerns
as Republic of Iraq because it involves the confiscatory and
discriminatory acts of a foreign government, concerns of federal rather
than state policy. Baltimore City is also inconsistent with the standard
provided in this Section. The anti-apartheid ordinance at issue there
clearly amounted to a continuing criticism of a foreign government's
public policy; the court even noted that the motive behind the ordinance
had been public objection to South Africa's policies.339 In upholding
the ordinance, the court not only failed to apply the standard suggested
in this Article but also ignored Zschernig's prohibition on state criticism
of foreign governments."
Congress and the Supreme Court have made it clear that the states
have broad authority to act on issues with foreign relations elements.
Unless a case raises some question as to an entity's status as a foreign
sovereign, requires an evaluation of the actions of a foreign sovereign
in its sovereign capacity, or involves immigration narrowly defined, it
raises no questions under federal common law.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Filartiga case holds that customary international law is federal
common law. Sabbatino holds that there exists a federal common law of
foreign relations that supplants state law with respect to the act of state
doctrine and, by implication, with respect to other subjects as well.
Zschernig reinforces Sabbatino by holding that state courts, by
addressing certain subjects involving international relations,
unconstitutionally intrude upon the federal government's authority.
Taken together, these cases form the underpinnings for the
338. Perhaps surprisingly, the Gynberg case may satisfy the suggested standard for applying
federal law. The plaintiff sought remedies that would have required the court either to violate
Kazakhstan's sovereignty or to determine the validity of Kazakhstan's exercise of sovereignty
within its own borders. Grynberg, 817 F. Supp. at 1359. It is likely that only federal law could
create these remedies. Claims that federal law has done so, however, are so frivolous that they
cannot support jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
339. Baltimore City, 562 A.2d at 737, 746.
340. The Baltimore City court had distinguished Zschernig, reasoning that the statute in that
case required ongoing case-by-case examination of foreign state practices whereas the Baltimore
ordinance was only a "single, general decision." Id. at 746.
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contemporary federalization of nontreaty international cases. This
approach is cause for serious concern. In particular, Filartiga and
Sabbatino/Zschernig, taken to their logical extremes, would displace
state authority in broad classes of cases. Numerous state and federal
courts, however, have taken positions inconsistent with this broad
conception of federal authority in nontreaty international cases. This
Article demonstrates that such federalization rests on a shaky
jurisdictional basis and that Filartiga was wrongly decided. More
importantly, this Article argues that courts need not federalize customary
international law in order to avoid the serious problems that were the
impetus for the creation of the federalizing approach. In place of this
mode of analysis, the Article suggests different standards for evaluating
claims that particular subjects are governed by the federal common law
of foreign relations.
By adopting this federalizing approach, the courts have placed
themselves in the position of Pandora just after she opened the box and
just before the contents began to escape. Aside from being unjustified
and unnecessary, the theories the federal courts have employed in
seeking to control international cases will, at best, involve them in the
resolution of disputes outside of their competence and, at worst, generate
judicial answers to questions affecting the foundations of U.S. foreign
relations. Surely basic foreign policy is the one area that the courts can
least usefully address. Particularly where it is argued that we should
substitute international standards for state law on subjects traditionally
controlled by American states, change should occur through debate in
fora accountable to the electorate rather than through actions by
countermajoritarian courts. Any judicial determination of these issues,
though justified by the modes of analysis criticized in this Article, is
illegitimate in the context of American political values.
International issues will play an increasingly important role in
American political and economic life as a result of greater international
interdependence. American courts will confront increasing numbers of
cases with international elements; how the courts should deal with such
cases is simply too important a question to leave to the judges. In any
event, the courts must employ in these cases a stronger analytical
framework than any they have yet developed. Simply treating all such
cases as involving federal common law will not suffice.
